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Economic	developments	during	the	quarter	have	been	drastically	influenced	
by	the	global	spread	of	COVID-19,	caused	by	a	coronavirus.	At the start of the 
year, global activity indicators appeared to point to a stabilisation of output growth, 
with some signs of recovery in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, the signing of 
the first phase of the US-China trade agreement in mid-January and the ratification 
by the British Parliament of the EU withdrawal agreement, at the end of that same 
month, had led to some easing of the uncertainty overshadowing the global outlook 
throughout 2019. However, the spread from late February of the epidemic that had 
originally emerged in China to other regions (notably to Europe) has abruptly derailed 
the global economy in scarcely a month. 
Indeed,	 the	disease	has	given	 rise	 to	a	public	health	challenge	of	 the	 first	
order.	 This	 has	 necessitated	 the	 adoption	 of	 extraordinary	 measures	
restricting	people’s	movements	and	the	closedown	of	a	significant	portion	of	
productive	activity.	The force of these measures, which are needed to contain the 
pandemic, is severely impacting global growth in the short term. Yet if this strategy 
proves effective in eradicating contagion, as the experience of the countries that 
first put it into practice would suggest (and it was these nations that first began to 
experience the impact of COVID-19), these adverse effects should be predominantly 
temporary. 
On	the	financial	markets,	the	spread	of	the	pandemic	has	given	rise	to	strong	
asset	price	fluctuations,	accompanied	by	a	markedly	pronounced	increase	in	
volatility.	Stock markets in the developed countries fell back by around 30%. This 
was a reflection of the impact of the crisis on corporate profits and of the increase 
in risk aversion, against a background of market volatility, which has also spread to 
the debt markets. There, the risk premia of the euro area peripheral countries 
increased, although they have reversed in part further to the ECB’s latest monetary 
policy measures, and there was a most pronounced widening of corporate debt 
spreads.
In	Spain,	the	need	to	rein	back	the	high	rate	of	increase	of	contagion	led	to	the	
declaration	of	a	state	of	alert	on	14	March.	Before the epidemic reached Europe, 
its effects on the Spanish economy appeared to be limited. The grinding to a halt of 
activity in certain regions of China had some impact on the demand for Spanish 
exports and on the import of intermediate goods used in the production of final 
goods, given the Asian giant’s high degree of integration into the global value chains. 
However, the true scale of the problem did not emerge until late February, when the 
spread of the disease to Italy and other European countries became manifest. 
1	 OVERVIEW
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The	scale	of	the	impact	of	the	pandemic	on	economic	activity	and	employment,	
including	that	stemming	from	the	necessary	containment	measures	adopted,	
will	be	most	pronounced	in	the	short	run.	The declaration of the state of alert in 
Spain entailed drastic restrictions on people’s movements and a practically complete 
halt to activity in certain services sectors, such as hotels and restaurants and retail 
trade. Production also came to a standstill in certain manufacturing sectors, such as 
the car industry, because of the demand freeze and the interruption of supply chains. 
Estimating	the	impact	and	the	duration	of	this	shock	to	the	economy	is	subject	
to	very	high	uncertainty.	The aggregate consequences on the economy as a whole 
will depend, among other factors, on the actual degree of the decline in output and 
consumption during the period the population is confined, and here it is only possible 
to make rough calculations. Moreover, the second factor of uncertainty relates to the 
length of time the extraordinary measures will be in force, which in turn depends on 
how successful they are in containing the disease. Impact and duration will also hinge 
crucially on the effectiveness of the measures implemented by the economic authorities. 
In	any	event,	even	with	the	notable	uncertainty	over	its	intensity	and	duration,	
the	shock	should	be	an	essentially	temporary	one.	In this respect, the speed and 
momentum of the subsequent recovery will depend crucially on the economic policy 
measures implemented to mitigate the adverse effects on activity of the decisions 
adopted to contain the virus. The measures that governments worldwide have been 
applying in recent days are aimed, precisely, at preventing the paralysis in activity at 
the height of the pandemic from translating into company closures and permanent 
job losses. This, in turn, calls for the response by the authorities responsible for the 
various facets of economic policy to be ambitious, nimble and coordinated. 
The	first	 line	of	defence	in	preventing	the	economic	effects	of	the	epidemic	
from	persisting	should	be	fiscal	policy.	Here, one of the main courses of action 
adopted by the various governments, including Spain’s, has been geared to softening 
the impact of the crisis on workers’ (including the self-employed) incomes. This has 
been done by relaxing the criteria applicable for receiving unemployment benefits 
and by exempting firms from social security contribution payments conditional upon 
them keeping jobs open. A second course of action is the approval of measures to 
prevent firms’ lack of liquidity from compromising their viability. In this connection, 
substantial public guarantees have been deployed and applied to credit extended to 
non-financial corporations and the self-employed, and a moratorium has been 
approved, under certain conditions, for their tax debts. The aim of these types of 
measures is to provide access to financing by solvent private agents facing liquidity 
problems, preventing them from ultimately becoming insolvent, in which case there 
would be greater and more permanent losses in activity and jobs. 
In	Europe’s	 case,	 action	by	national	 fiscal	 authorities	 requires	 the	 resolute	
backing	 of	 supranational	 economic	 policies. Indeed, the role that national 
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governments in the EU can play in contributing to the recovery is crucial. They must 
avail themselves of the various mechanisms which, in the wake of the crisis, will help 
keep in place the contractual relationships between employers and employees, the 
commercial relationships between customers and suppliers, and the credit 
relationships between lenders and borrowers. Yet these arrangements must be 
backed by the supranational institutions of the EU and, in particular, of the euro area; 
if they are not, their effectiveness might be limited in those countries that have least 
budgetary leeway. 
To	this	end,	the	ECB	has	recently	announced	extraordinary	measures	aimed	
at	preventing,	as	in	the	last	crisis,	any	recurrence	of	financial	rupture	among	
the	 various	 euro	 area	 economies.	 On 18 March, the ECB Governing Council 
announced a new emergency public and private asset purchase programme (PEPP) 
to combat the pandemic, for an amount of €750 billion over the rest of 2020. The new 
programme, which may be extended into 2021, envisages the possibility of purchases 
being made flexibly throughout its duration. This flexibility concerns the distribution 
of purchases across asset classes (public and privately owned alike) and their timing, 
along with the possibility of temporary departures from the rules prevailing in terms 
of the cross-country distribution of public debt purchases, which may moreover also 
take the form of Greek government bond purchases, unlike in previous programmes. 
The aim of such flexibility is, indeed, to ensure that the current accommodative 
stance of monetary policy translates uniformly into easy financial conditions across 
the different Member States. It may thus benefit euro area households, firms and 
governments as a whole. 
These	measures	complement	 those	adopted	by	 the	ECB	Governing	Council	
scarcely	a	week	earlier.	At its meeting on 12 March, the ECB Council had already 
approved various measures. These had included an extension of the asset purchase 
programme previously in place, for an amount of €120 billion, over the rest of 2020, 
and various long-term refinancing operations, which are key to the transmission of 
monetary policy. 
Furthermore,	 the	 euro	 area	 banking	 supervision	 authority	 has	 relaxed	 the	
capital	and	liquidity	requirements	applicable	to	banks.	The aim of this decision 
by the Single Supervisory Mechanism is to ensure that banks can carry on providing 
euro area households and firms with sufficient volumes of financing. 
The	scale	of	the	challenge	calls	for	the	Community	authorities	to	resolutely	
contribute	too.	Admittedly, the European Commission (EC) has mobilised several 
Community instruments to support the measures adopted by national governments 
(such as structural funds and various Community budget items) and this has relaxed 
the arrangements governing fiscal rules and State aid. But more resolute action is 
needed. The current health crisis overspills national borders and is therefore a 
challenge common to all euro area countries and to Europe as a whole. Containing 
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the humanitarian, social and economic costs of this crisis requires coordinated and 
cooperative action that uses the budgetary and financial tools already in place 
Europe-wide (including the potential mobilisation of the funds of the European 
Stability Mechanism, for a potential amount of around €500 billion). But the possibility 
of adding budgetary risk-sharing (mutualisation) elements, via common debt 
instruments, or the deployment of pooled economic and social coverage instruments, 
such as a European unemployment fund, should also be considered. 
Given	 the	 unusually	 and	 highly	 uncertain	 circumstances	 described,	 this	
Report	 does	 not,	 unlike	 as	 usual,	 contain	 medium-term	 macroeconomic	
projections	for	the	Spanish	economy.	Only a short period has elapsed since the 
state of alert was declared. And this means that indicators that provide for 
measurement with minimal rigour and accuracy of the scale and duration of the 
effects of the crisis on activity and employment – which, as indicated, will foreseeably 
trend very negatively in the short term – are still not available. Moreover, the outlook 
will be influenced by the effects of the major economic policy measures approved in 
different areas. In these circumstances, the Banco de España has, like other central 
banks that usually publish macroeconomic projections around this time (such as the 
US Federal Reserve and the French central bank), opted to postpone the preparation 
and publication of its projections. As indicators allowing for some lessening of the 
current, extraordinary degree of uncertainty become available, the Banco de España 
will resume publication of its macroeconomic projections, keeping all of its usual 
public communication channels open in the meantime. In any event, its stepped-up 
monitoring of the economy’s economic and financial position will continue.
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The spread of the coronavirus health crisis outside Asia, 
which has ultimately led to the confinement of the 
population in Spain and in many other European countries, 
is an unusually virulent shock. It has sharply altered the 
trajectory of our economy. This box describes the main 
features of the developments observed prior to this shock. 
The analysis of short-term economic developments is 
usually based on the assessment of various monthly 
indicators, which are released with a certain time lag with 
respect to the period to which they refer. Given this lag, 
the latest data currently available in the indicators of 
Spanish economic activity refer to January and February; 
accordingly, they do not  capture the latest adverse 
developments. 
Overall, the conjunctural indicators most representative of 
the behaviour of activity suggest that GDP had followed a 
similar trajectory in the two opening months of the year to 
that observed in late 2019. Indeed, the Banco de España’s 
models for short-term GDP forecasting had projected 
growth of around 0.4% for the current quarter.1 Along 
these same lines, the latest Social Security registration 
figures, which showed a notable improvement in monthly 
employment creation in February, had suggested - if we 
ignore the foreseeably much less favourable path in March 
- quarterly growth in employment similar to that observed 
in late 2019 (see Chart 1). 
The somewhat better than expected behaviour of 
employment in February, the improvement in confidence 
in the first two months of the year and the stabilisation 
around the turn of the year in the year-on-year rate of 
increase in the outstanding balance of consumer credit, 
following the slowdown seen since mid-2018 (see Chart 
2), suggested that household spending would foreseeably 
post positive growth in these months, following a zero 
increase in 2019 Q4. Conversely, new private car 
registrations held on a clearly negative trend in the first 
two months of the year, while January retail sales proved 
somewhat weaker than expected. 
As to residential investment, the latest indicators relating 
to supply, which anticipate trends in activity in the sector 
in the coming months, such as building permits and 
construction material production indices, evidenced 
moderately negative signs for the start of the year. On the 
contrary, the data for the demand-related indicators, such 
as sales and mortgages on residential assets, were 
somewhat more buoyant. Finally, house prices, on figures 
to 2019 Q4, also pointed to an easing in residential activity, 
both in the second-hand property and new dwellings 
segments. And this especially in those regions where 
prices had been more expansionary since the start of the 
recovery. 
After turning down heavily in Q4, the business investment 
outlook had improved somewhat in the opening months 
of the year. Indeed, to February, some qualitative 
indicators such as the manufacturing PMI and the 
European Commission’s business climate survey, had 
shown something of a pick-up in business sentiment (see 
Chart 3). Moreover, financial conditions for non-financial 
corporations remained easy.
The scant information available for the start of the year 
suggested a reduction in the contribution of external 
demand to GDP growth in Q1, following the significant 
upward surprise in 2019 Q4, due essentially to the 
slowdown in goods and services exports. In the case of 
inbound tourism, the latest information on non-resident 
spending, which covers only January, showed a 
continuation of its expansionary trajectory. This was 
thanks to the increase in average spending per tourist, 
which offset the slowdown in total inflows prompted by 
the reduction in the main European outbound-tourist 
markets (see Chart 4). 
Turning to public finances, in February the Spanish 
Parliament approved a revaluation of pensions and a rise 
in civil servants’ remuneration which, so far, have not 
been accompanied by additional increases in revenue, 
against the background of the extension, for the second 
year running, of the 2018 State Budget. The latest 
information would suggest that headway had not been 
made in 2019 in correcting the public finances imbalances, 
and a budget deficit/GDP ratio similar to that of the 
previous year was expected to be recorded. That would 
entail a structural deficit in line with that of 2015, leading 
to the conclusion that the expansionary phase was not 
harnessed to build up a budgetary buffer that would have 
allowed the current health crisis to be tackled from a 
sounder position. The mildly declining path of the public 
Box 1
THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	BEFORE	THE	SPREAD	OF	THE	CORONAVIRUS	EPIDEMIC
1  See A. Arencibia Pareja, A. Gómez Loscos, M. de Luis López and G. Pérez Quirós (2018), A short-term forecasting model for the Spanish economy: 
GDP and its demand components, Documentos Ocasionales 1801, Banco de España; and Álvarez, Cabrero and Urtasun (2014), A procedure for 
short-term GDP forecasting, Economic Bulletin, Banco de España, October.
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Box 1
THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	BEFORE	THE	SPREAD	OF	THE	CORONAVIRUS	EPIDEMIC	(cont’d)
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social, European Commission, Markit Economics and Banco de España.
a Royal Decree-Law 6/2019 of 1 March 2019 restored the right of non-professional carers of dependents to enter into a special agreement with the 
Social Security authorities. Under the agreement, the State bears the cost of their Social Security contributions. This legal amendment has increased 
the number of non-professional carers from 7,300 (as observed in March 2019) to 57,600 (February 2020).
b Securitised lending not included in this segment.
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debt/GDP ratio is expected to have continued in 2019, 
ending the year at 95.5% of GDP. 
Inflation, measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP), has continued to post very moderate rates 
in recent months, standing at 0.9% in February (see Chart 
5). Influencing these dynamics were, mainly, the year-on-
year declines observed in energy prices. Core inflation 
grew in February by 1.3%, a rate slightly up on that 
observed over the past two years (see Chart 6). In terms 
of components, services inflation stood at 1.7%, while 
non-energy industrial goods prices held at a more 
moderate year-on-year growth rate (0.6% in February). 
Inflation in Spain has continued to stand marginally below 
that recorded in the euro area. 
On the costs side, the latest available information on 
collective bargaining agreements, to February, suggested 
somewhat more moderate wage increases in 2020 (2%) 
than in 2019 (2.3%), affecting a higher number of workers 
(6.2 million). However, these wage rises solely reflect 
agreements signed in prior years. 
In short, the information available for the first two months 
of the year pointed to a continuation of the expansionary 
phase, underpinned by some reduction in external 
uncertainties. Although there are still no monthly indicators 
that reflect the fact, the previous trajectory has been 
dramatically dislocated as from the last week of February, 
further to the outbreak of the coronavirus epidemic in 
Europe and, in particular, in Spain. The increase in 
uncertainty, the confinement at home of the population 
and the closedown of trade not involving the sale of staple 
goods is estimated to have translated into a notable 
reduction in private consumption. The contraction in 
demand and uncertainty are expected to have brought 
private investment decisions to a standstill. As regards 
external trade in goods and services, the impact of the 
heightening health crisis is estimated to have been 
particularly severe in the tourism sector, as the sharp 
recent decline in new hotel bookings and the widespread 
cancellation of those made earlier suggest. In terms of 
prices, the fall-off in demand and the strong reduction in oil 
prices will foreseeably lead to a decline in the inflation rate. 
Box 1
THE	SPANISH	ECONOMY	BEFORE	THE	SPREAD	OF	THE	CORONAVIRUS	EPIDEMIC	(cont’d)
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Changes in oil prices are determined by supply and 
demand-side factors that bear on their dynamics. In 
recent months, for instance, the weakness in the global 
demand for oil, largely linked to the slowdown in China 
brought on by the COVID-19 crisis, has tended to depress 
oil prices. In addition to the dynamics stemming from 
cyclical fluctuations of the economy, oil prices are regularly 
affected by geopolitical events. A case in point are 
conflicts linked to the Middle East, among others. The 
frequency of such tensions has tended to increase since 
May 2018 (when the United States withdrew from the 
nuclear agreement),1 with some episodes of particular 
intensity in late 2019 and early 2020.2 Given the 
significance of the region for global oil production and 
exports,3 this box analyses the hypothetical impact of 
new geopolitical conflicts arising in the Middle East on oil 
prices. It further discusses some factors that tend to 
mitigate this impact. 
The effect a geopolitical event has on oil prices depends 
on the volume of output affected by the event and its 
duration, as well as the economic conditions under which 
it arises. Indeed, the main events of this type in the Middle 
East since 1973 differ in terms of these dimensions, and 
they have thus exerted heterogeneous effects on oil prices 
(see Chart 1).4 Despite this heterogeneity, a common 
characteristic of all these events is that they have been 
transitory, leading to declines in output, on average, in the 
four months following the event, which tend to be 
progressively reversed by the influence of mitigating 
factors. These include most notably the spare capacity of 
other global producers, the use of inventories and the 
strategic reserves of certain countries. 
On the basis of these characteristics, Chart 4 shows the 
reaction of oil prices to two hypothetical geopolitical 
scenarios, which differ in terms of their intensity.5 In the 
less adverse, “moderate” scenario, disruption to oil 
production of the order of 800,000 barrels per day (bpd), 
i.e. 0.8% of global output, is assumed, equivalent to the 
combined current exports of Iran (around 300,000 bpd) 
and of northern Iraq (500,000 bpd) (see Chart 2). In the 
“adverse” scenario, the shock is considered to affect 4% 
of global oil output. That would be tantamount to adding 
to the disruption of the previous scenario another shock 
equivalent to the events spreading to the rest of Iraq, 
which is the second-ranked producer and exporter of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC). The exercise does not consider much more 
extreme events, e.g. a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,6 
a strategic channel through which almost 15 million 
barrels are moved every day (see Chart 3), since there are 
no precedents for an event of this nature. 
The results of the simulations indicate that, following the 
event, crude oil prices would increase in the first month by 
a maximum amount of $38 under the adverse scenario 
and $6 under the moderate one. After peaking, prices 
would fall. Relative to the baseline scenario, the average 
increase in six months would stand at around $20 under 
the adverse scenario and at $4 under the moderate 
scenario (see, once more, Chart 4). 
However, the results of the simulations should be taken 
as an upper bound to the rise in crude oil prices in such 
episodes. In particular, the estimates shown stem from 
average historical patterns, when there is actually evidence 
that the sensitivity of oil prices to supply and demand 
shocks might be lower at present, i.e. the aforementioned 
mitigating factors might now be acting with greater 
intensity. Prominent among these factors is OPEC’s high 
spare capacity (currently estimated at 3.4 million bpd), 
the notable levels of global inventories and strategic 
reserves (equivalent to around 92 days of global output 
for the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development), and the boom, since 2011, 
Box 2
GEOPOLITICAL	TENSIONS	AND	OIL	PRICES
1  The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was adopted in 2015 with the aim of reducing Iran’s uranium enrichment in exchange for lifting the economic 
sanctions on the country.
2  The oil market has recently been affected by several episodes of particular intensity, including most notably the attack on Saudi oil facilities, which 
temporarily affected 6% of total output last September, the siege of the US embassy in Baghdad in late 2019 and the US response to these attacks 
in early 2020.
3	 	Although	the	significance	of	the	region	has	diminished	owing	to	the	growth	of	shale	oil	in	the	United	States,	it	continues	to	produce	28.5%	of	global	
oil output. 
4  See J. D. Hamilton (2011), Historical oil shocks, National Bureau of Economic Research.
5	 	The	calculations	are	made	using	a	Bayesian	structural	VAR	model.	In	this	model,	shocks	are	identified	by	means	of	sign	restrictions.	This	enables	a	
distinction to be drawn between supply-side shocks, global demand, precautionary demand and idiosyncratic demand factors of the oil market. The 
model is estimated with monthly data using a sample commencing in January 1980. 
6  A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz might entail a reduction of around 10% in global production, even if the pipelines of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates and Iraq were to function at maximum capacity. 
This early-release box was published on 4 March
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Box 2
GEOPOLITICAL	TENSIONS	AND	OIL	PRICES	(cont’d)
SOURCES: International Energy Agency, Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a The figure reflects the maximum fall in total oil production during the geopolitical shock indicated by Hamilton (2011), except for the Iranian revolution 
and the Saudi Arabia oil attack, which were estimated in-house. The duration of the shocks varies significantly, as shown by the width of the events 
(blue bands).
b Considering a temporary drop in production of 0.8 million and 4 million barrels per day in the moderate and adverse scenarios, respectively. The 
shock recedes gradually over 4 months.
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in shale oil production in the United States, which has 
converted this country into the leading world producer, 
ahead of Saudi Arabia and of Russia. In particular, this 
latter factor has been playing a growing role in oil price 
trends in the past decade.7 Compared with traditional 
crude oil production, the investment period and time to 
maturity of shale oil is much shorter, allowing supply to 
react swiftly to shocks that tend to raise crude prices. 
This makes supply fairly elastic in the medium term8 and 
is conducive to price stability. Hence, price increases 
tend to go hand in hand with the rapid drilling of new 
wells in less than six months (see Chart 5). Moreover, the 
productivity of North American producers has increased 
considerably since late 2015.9
Box 2
GEOPOLITICAL	TENSIONS	AND	OIL	PRICES	(cont’d)
7  For further information, see D. Santabárbara (2017), “The oil market: recent developments and outlook”, Analytical Article, Economic Bulletin, 3/2017, 
Banco de España. 
8	 	A	model	developed	by	the	Congressional	Budget	Office	(CBO)	to	estimate	shale	oil	production	in	the	United	States	shows	that,	although	supply	is	
inelastic in the short term, it is fairly elastic after two years (M. Lasky (2016), The Outlook for US Production of Shale Oil, Congressional	Budget	Office).
9	 	As	a	result,	fewer	wells	are	needed	to	maintain	production.	Extraction	in	the	first	month	of	operation	has	doubled	since	2007	and	the	rise	in	production	
persists throughout their life cycle. See R. Decker, A. Flaaen,  and M. Tito (2016). Unraveling the Oil Conundrum: Productivity Improvements and Cost 
Declines in the US Shale Oil Industry, FEDS Notes, Washington, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 22 March.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 1/2020  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
In December 2019, Sweden’s central bank (Sveriges 
Riksbank) raised its benchmark interest rate (the repo 
rate) for the second time in twelve months. It set it at 0%, 
up from the previous level of -0.25%, with effect from 
January 2020. Swedish interest rates thus abandoned the 
negative territory in which Sveriges Riksbank had placed 
them since February 2015 (see Chart 1). Holding rates 
negative had been part of the raft of unconventional 
monetary policy measures set in place by Sweden’s 
monetary authority since 2009. This also included forward 
guidance on interest rates, bond purchases, currency 
swaps and support for lending to businesses, among 
other things. This box summarises the macroeconomic 
and financial stability conditioning factors which, 
according to the Swedish authorities, are behind this 
monetary policy decision.
Sveriges Riksbank justified its decision to increase the 
interest rate to 0%, which it had already anticipated in 
October, essentially on the basis of inflation developments. 
In Sweden, the inflation rate had stood at around the 
target of 2% from 2017 until end-2019 (see Chart 2) and 
Box 3
RECENT	CHANGES	IN	THE	SWEDISH	CENTRAL	BANK’S	MONETARY	POLICY
SOURCES: Sveriges Riksbank, Swedish National Institute of Statistics and Konjunkturinstitutet.
a CPIF inflation, which excludes changes in mortgage rates, is Sveriges Riksbank's target variable.
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Box 3
RECENT	CHANGES	IN	THE	SWEDISH	CENTRAL	BANK’S	MONETARY	POLICY	(cont’d)
inflation expectations had remained relatively anchored 
between 1.8% and 2% over the previous year. According 
to the Swedish central bank’s analysis, inflation is 
estimated to be on a path compatible with the fulfilment of 
its objective. Admittedly, the Swedish economy slowed in 
2019 and the growth outlook was revised downwards (see 
Chart 3); but Sveriges Riksbank’s analysis points to the 
pace of growth in activity returning to normal following a 
period of relatively high buoyancy. The decision emerged 
from Sweden’s Monetary Policy Committee after intense 
debate, as evidenced by the minutes of its December 
meeting. In particular, the minutes noted the difficulties of 
accurately gauging the extent to which inflation 
expectations are firmly anchored around the central 
bank’s target. And this against a background in which 
Sveriges Riksbank foresees an inflation path slowly 
converging at the end of the projection horizon on the 
aforementioned target (see Chart 2).
According to the central bank’s projections, published in 
December with the press release on the monetary policy 
decision, the policy rate will be held at 0% until 2022 Q2. 
This contrasts with its previous December 2018 projection, 
which anticipated a path of further increases over the 
coming years (see Chart 1).1 Therefore, for Sveriges 
Riksbank, the rate rise does not necessarily mean a 
tightening of the monetary policy stance,2 but a return to 
a more conventional monetary policy without negative 
interest rates which, among other things, would provide 
some leeway, if needed. 
In addition to the above-mentioned considerations, in its 
press release Sveriges Riksbank also lists some of the 
financial stability-related arguments taken into 
consideration. Particular mention is made of the possibility 
that economic agents would no longer perceive the 
negative rates situation as temporary. Among other risks, 
the Swedish monetary authority considers the hypothetical 
adverse consequences for the banking system, the private 
sector’s potential over-indebtedness and a possible 
excessive increase in risk appetite, which might give rise 
to distortions in the functioning of financial markets, 
including the overvaluation of certain assets. 
As for the first risk, according to Sveriges Riksbank banks 
have not passed on negative interest rates to household 
deposits, owing to the perceived temporariness of the 
measure, and banks’ lending capacity and profitability 
have not been affected significantly to date. However, the 
Swedish monetary authority does not completely rule out 
that continuing to apply a negative interest rate policy for 
a very long period of time could hypothetically prompt a 
decline in the demand for deposits. And that could in turn 
produce a shortage of this type of financing at some 
banks.3 Additionally, according to the monetary authority, 
squeezing bank margins for a sufficiently protracted 
period of time could theoretically affect new lending by 
some banks. 
Possible adverse effects of a premature increase in 
interest rates on financial stability were also pointed out; 
agents’ ability to pay could be hampered against a 
backdrop of lower growth and high levels of private debt 
(see Chart 4). Nevertheless, Sveriges Riksbank has 
stressed that private-sector indebtedness-related risks – 
largely linked to the real estate market4 – must be 
addressed by macroprudential policy instruments (within 
the remit since 2014 of the Finansinspektionen, which 
reports to the Ministry of Finance) and by structural 
reforms.
In conclusion, and based on the foregoing considerations, 
of different sign, Sveriges Riksbank considers that, in net 
terms, the negative rates policy has been beneficial for 
the Swedish economy. It likewise believes any future side-
effects can be assumed, though it highlights the need for 
them to be analysed in greater detail. 
1	 	Note	that,	unlike	ECB/Eurosystem	projections,	which	assume	that	interest	rates	will	follow	the	path	expected	by	financial	markets,	the	Riksbank’s	
macroeconomic projections are shaped by its own expected path of policy rates.
2  In the weeks following Sveriges Riksbank’s announcement in October, the Swedish krona appreciated against the dollar and the euro after a period 
of	protracted	weakness,	which	could	mean	that	the	financial	markets	perceived	a	tightening.	However,	attributing	the	appreciation	solely	to	monetary	
policy	is	difficult	since	it	coincided	with	a	period	of	upward	surprises	in	economic	indicators	and	greater	optimism	about	world	trade,	which	is	highly	
significant	for	a	small	open	economy	like	Sweden’s.	Since	early	2020,	the	Swedish	krona	has	depreciated	again	due	to	global	uncertainty	and	worse-
than-expected macroeconomic data.
3	 	Note	that	the	low	use	of	cash	in	Sweden	could	soften	the	possible	difficulties	of	potential	liquidity	problems.	Worldwide,	Sweden	is	the	economy	which	
least uses cash, and its objective is to replace it with electronic means of payment by 2023. Thus, if negative interest rates were applied to household 
deposits, this would possibly have a more subdued effect on the demand for cash.
4  Since 1994, there has been a robust upward trend in house prices in Sweden which is essentially attributable to structural factors such as supply 
shortages and high construction costs.
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On 5 February the European Commission announced the 
start of the review of the economic governance framework 
for the European Union (EU). It further offered an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the current surveillance 
framework.1 Figure 1 shows the main phases and 
characteristics of the review. The first phase of the process 
will involve an extensive public consultation, running to 
mid-2020, in which all European institutions, the Member 
States and civil society will participate. The Commission 
will give itself until end-2020 to assess the opinions 
received, reflect on the steps to be taken and submit, if 
appropriate, a formal proposal for reform. 
The EU’s economic governance framework has undergone 
numerous changes since its inception, progressively 
adapting to the new requirements arising during the 
European construction process. In its initial design, the 
framework was chiefly geared to preventing the effects of 
excessive budgetary imbalances on financial stability in a 
monetary union. The 2005 reform sought to add some 
flexibility with a view to being able to address adverse 
cyclical situations. Following the 2008 economic and 
financial crisis, the focus moved once more to the risks 
that high levels of public debt entail for euro area economic 
and financial stability. Against this background, the latest 
“six-pack” and “two-pack” legislative reforms were 
implemented in 2011 and 2013, respectively. These 
introduced elements to strengthen the sustainability of 
public finances, to add flexibility to fiscal rules and to 
improve the Member States’ budgetary processes. In 
addition, surveillance was extended beyond the fiscal 
domain to address macroeconomic imbalances from a 
broader perspective (under the Macroeconomic 
Imbalances Procedure), and a macroeconomic oversight 
procedure was set in place for those countries receiving 
financial assistance. These changes were integrated into 
the European Semester, the framework conceived to 
coordinate economic policies at the European level and to 
Box 4
THE	REFORM	OF	THE	FISCAL	SURVEILLANCE	FRAMEWORK	IN	EUROPE
1	 	Community	regulations	require	the	European	Commission	to	conduct	an	economic	governance	framework	review	every	five	years,	and	to	submit	a	
report on the implementation of the existing legislation. 
SOURCE: European Commission.
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steer the structural reforms necessary at the national 
level. 
According to the Commission, the essential aim of the 
review under way is to strengthen the effectiveness of its 
oversight. It is mindful that the current macroeconomic 
environment, marked by low potential growth, population 
ageing and low interest rates, is very different from that of 
previous reforms. At the same time, the EU has to respond 
to new challenges, such as digitalisation and climate 
change (as seen with the European Green Pact).  
The consultation addresses various issues: the means of 
ensuring compliance with accountable fiscal policies, 
increasing the transparency, flexibility and simplicity of 
the rules; the review of the macroeconomic imbalances 
procedure; increased incentives for investment and for 
structural reform; and enhanced economic policy 
coordination and the deepening of EMU. 
The assessment conducted by the Commission notes 
both the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
framework. As regards strengths, the Commission 
highlights the fact that the latest legislative reforms have 
reinforced the policy oversight framework, providing for 
the correction of economic imbalances and, specifically, 
the reduction of excessive budget deficits. At the same 
time, the Commission indicates the momentum given to 
ongoing economic convergence in the EU and greater 
economic policy coordination. Further, mention is made 
of the creation of independent fiscal institutions and of 
enhanced national budgetary processes and medium-
term fiscal planning procedures. 
However, the Commission also recognises in its 
assessment certain areas for improvement. Firstly, it notes 
that the ongoing incremental reform of the fiscal framework 
has led to greater complexity, with diverse procedures 
and numerous rules. Admittedly, this design sought to 
make the framework more flexible and adaptable. But it 
may also have deterred ownership of the fiscal rules (see 
Chart 1), while reducing transparency and hampering 
communication. 
Additionally, the Member States’ fiscal policies have 
retained some procyclical bias, as illustrated in Chart 2 
The Commission expresses particular concern over the 
lack of discipline in expansionary phases, during which 
countries have not sufficiently rebuilt their fiscal buffers. 
Such behaviour, according to the Commission, is 
expected to have restricted the capacity of the framework 
to coordinate national fiscal policies, with appropriate 
cross-country differentiation, and to attain a suitable fiscal 
stance for the euro area as a whole. 
The Commission also highlights the persistence of high 
levels of public debt in some countries, which are in turn 
far from meeting their medium-term fiscal targets (see 
Chart 3), while their reform-geared momentum appears to 
have slackened. 
Finally, another area for improvement is the quality of 
public finances. This covers both the composition of 
public spending and revenue, and their capacity to 
support growth and social inclusion. In this respect, the 
Commission stresses that public investment is the 
spending component that traditionally bears a high 
proportion of the adjustment in fiscal consolidation 
processes (see Chart 4), which underscores the 
importance of protecting this spending component in the 
design of the fiscal surveillance framework. 
The Commission’s analysis shares many of the concerns 
voiced by experts and international institutions. These 
refer to the need for a comprehensive review of the 
framework that reduces its complexity, enhances 
compliance and contributes to the design of countercyclical 
fiscal policies and to the sustainability of public finances.2 
In this connection, the review is timely and necessary. 
Moreover, it should be an integral part of the ongoing 
deepening and strengthening of EMU. In particular, the 
proposals envisaged should be completed with other 
elements that help enhance fiscal policy design and 
coordination at the European level, such as the introduction 
of a central fiscal capacity that reinforces the stabilising 
role of fiscal policy. 
Box 4
THE	REFORM	OF	THE	FISCAL	SURVEILLANCE	FRAMEWORK	IN	EUROPE	(cont’d)
2  For an exhaustive review see, inter alia Andrle, M., J. Bluedorn, L. Eyraud, T. Kinda, P. Koeva Brooks, G. Schwartz and A. Weber (2015) “Reforming 
Fiscal Governance in the European Union” IMF Staff Discussion Note 15/09, May; Banco de España (2017), Annual Report 2016, Chapter 4, “Fiscal 
policy	 in	 the	euro	area”;	Kamps,	C.,	N.	Leiner-Killinger	 (2019)	“Taking	stock	of	 the	 functioning	of	 the	EU	fiscal	 rules	and	options	 for	reform”	ECB	
Occasional	 Paper,	 No.	 231,	 August,	 and	 European	 Fiscal	 Board	 (2019),	 “Assessment	 of	 EU	 fiscal	 rules	with	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 six	 and	 two-pack	
legislation”, August.
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Box 4
THE	REFORM	OF	THE	FISCAL	SURVEILLANCE	FRAMEWORK	IN	EUROPE	(cont’d)
SOURCES: European Commission and Eurostat.
a Percentage (%) of years between 1999 and 2019 in which budget deficits exceeded 3% of GDP and public debt exceeded 60% of GDP.
b The scatter plot contains values of variables between 1999 and 2018.
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On 12 September 2019, the Governing Council of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) adopted a comprehensive 
package of monetary policy measures to ensure the 
sustained convergence of euro area inflation towards its 
target.1 Specifically, in order to support the credit institution-
based transmission of monetary policy, the ECB decided to 
introduce a two-tier system (TTS) for the remuneration of 
the reserves held by credit institutions in their current 
accounts at their national central banks. Under this new 
system, the negative deposit facility rate is not applied to a 
portion of credit institutions’ excess reserve holdings.2
This box describes the main features of the TTS and 
assesses its impact on the distribution of excess liquidity 
within the euro area and on money market rates.
The TTS came into effect on 30 October 2019 (start of the 
seventh reserve maintenance period, MP7). The Governing 
Council decided that the exempt tier would be equal to six 
times (multiplier) the minimum reserve requirement and 
would be remunerated at zero percent. The multiplier is 
the same for all credit institutions and is set such that 
short-term money market rates in the euro area are not 
unduly affected. It may be adjusted over time in line with 
changing levels of excess liquidity holdings. The second 
tier (non-exempt) will apply to all the excess reserves held 
by credit institutions in their current accounts exceeding 
that threshold and will continue to be remunerated at zero 
percent or at the deposit facility rate (currently -0.5%), 
whichever is lower (see Diagram 1). 
The application of TTS generates two types of situations 
for institutions, since excess reserves are unevenly 
distributed across the Eurosystem. Some institutions 
have excess reserves exceeding the exemption threshold 
and others’ excess reserves are below this threshold. The 
latter institutions have unused exemption allowances  and 
can raise liquidity without increasing its cost. 
This uneven distribution of excess reserves prompted 
institutions to embark on a redistribution process as soon 
as the TTS came into effect, to benefit as much as possible 
from the new system. As a result of this process, the 
unused exemption allowances have now become residual, 
representing, in relative terms, 5% and 4% of total 
exemption allowances in MP7 and MP8, respectively.
As was to be expected, credit institutions with unused 
exemption allowances and with reserve holdings at the 
deposit facility immediately transferred them to their 
current accounts to take advantage of the new measure 
(see Chart 1).
Box 5
IMPACT	OF	THE	APPLICATION	OF	THE	TWO-TIER	SYSTEM
1  For more details, see Box 1.2 of the Financial Stability Report (Autumn 2019, Banco de España).
2  Bank reserves are liquid balances held by credit institutions at their central bank. Credit institutions are required to maintain a minimum level of reserves 
(known as the “minimum reserve requirement”) equal to 1% of their eligible liabilities. The amount of reserves held by credit institutions in excess of the 
reserve requirements are known as “excess reserves”. 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a DF: Deposit facility; MRO: Main refinancing operations.
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Also, in the first few days of MP7, credit institutions entered 
into agreements with one another to transfer liquidity from 
those with excess reserves exceeding the threshold to those 
with unused exemption allowances. Based on MP6 data, if 
the TTS had been applied in that period, the Eurosystem 
would have had unused exemption allowances totalling €227 
billion. As a result of the liquidity tranfers, this amount was 
reduced to €37 billion in MP7 and decreased further to €30 
billion in MP8. This reduction in unused exemption allowances 
was observed in all euro area countries (see Chart 2). 
The redistribution of liquidity has mostly taken place 
within each country. However, liquidity has also been 
Box 5
IMPACT	OF	THE	APPLICATION	OF	THE	TWO-TIER	SYSTEM	(cont’d)
SOURCES: ECB website (www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/minimum_reserves/html/index.en.html), ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, 
MMSR and RepoFunds Rate website (www.repofundsrate.com).
a The aggregate Eurosystem Target2 balance is always zero as, by definition, the sum of Target2 assets is equal to the sum of Target2 liabilities. 
To illustrate the TTS effect, this chart shows only the sum of the assets balance or liabilities balance. This prevents the balances from offsetting 
each other.
b Germany is shown with a positive Target2 balance because its Target2 is on the asset side of the balance sheet. Italy is shown with a negative Target 2 
balance because its Target2 is on the liabilities side of the balance sheet.
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redistributed among credit institutions across euro area 
countries. Specifically, based on MP6 data, there were 
four countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Slovakia) whose 
unused exemption allowances would not have been fully 
exhausted with domestic liquidity transfers and could 
therefore be used up with cross-border liquidity transfers. 
Of the €227 billion of the unused exemption allowances, 
€188 billion could be accounted for by domestic 
transactions and €39 billion by cross-border transactions. 
Although this effect has not significantly reduced the 
concentration of excess liquidity in a few countries, it has 
been sufficient to reduce the Eurosystem’s total TARGET2 
balances (see Chart 3). This effect is clearly observed in 
Germany, in the decline of its TARGET2 asset balances 
which reflects liquidity outflows to other countries, 
possibly including Italy, where liquidity inflows via 
TARGET2 are reflected in the decrease of its TARGET2 
liability balances (see Chart 4). 
The deals reached by institutions have largely taken place 
in the money markets,3 mostly concentrated in the repo 
Box 5
IMPACT	OF	THE	APPLICATION	OF	THE	TWO-TIER	SYSTEM	(cont’d)
3  Institutions could also have redistributed liquidity through asset sales and intragroup distribution.
SOURCES: MMSR, ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and the RepoFunds Rate website (www.repofundsrate.com).
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Jan-19 Mar-19 May-19 Jul-19 Sep-19 Nov-19 Jan-20
€ bn
Chart 5
SHORT-TERM BORROWING VOLUMES OF MMSR BANKS WITH UNUSED 
EXEMPTION ALLOWANCES 
Start TTS
Year-end 
effect
0
50
100
150
200
250
Jan-19 Mar-19 May-19 Jul-19 Sep-19 Nov-19 Jan-20
€ bn
Chart 6
SHORT-TERM LENDING VOLUMES OF MMSR BANKS WITHOUT UNUSED 
EXEMPTION ALLOWANCES 
Start TTS
Year-end 
effect
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
-1.0
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
Sep-19 Oct-19 Nov-19 Dec-19 Jan-20 Feb-20
REPOFUND SPAIN REPOFUND ITALY REPOFUND GERMANY REPOFUND FRANCE €STR
€ bn
Chart 7
MONEY MARKET RATES
MP 6 MP 7
Start
(30.10.2019)
MP 8
Year-end
effect
MP 1
SECURED SEGMENT UNSECURED SEGMENT
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 1/2020  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
segment and using central counterparty clearing houses. 
An increase in the activity of the unsecured segment has 
also been observed, to some extent revitalising a market 
that had very low volumes before application of the TTS 
(see Charts 5 and 6). The heightened activity was due to 
an increase in financing transactions by institutions with 
unused allowances.
Following the liquidity redistribution process and the 
calibration of the multiplier at six times the minimum 
reserve requirements, the excess reserves that continue 
to be remunerated at -0.5% amount to €900 billion. This 
is a sufficiently large amount for interest rates to have 
been only marginally affected in the first few days of MP7 
and to remain aligned with policy rates. In the deposit 
segment, the €STR (unsecured interbank rate) has barely 
been affected and remains at levels that are very close to 
those before the TTS was applied. Conversely, in the repo 
segment, a rise in interest rates was observed when the 
TTS came into effect, particularly in repos with Italian or 
Spanish collateral (6 bp and 4 bp, respectively), but it was 
corrected within a few days (see Chart 7). It should be 
noted that the year-end effect in MP8 makes it difficult to 
interpret the impact on money markets of applying the 
TTS during that period.
To conclude, application of the TTS has led to higher 
interbank activity to redistribute excess liquidity not only 
at the national level but also among euro area countries. 
Money market rates have only been marginally affected 
and remain aligned with policy rates. Since the measure 
has only recently been implemented, a more thorough 
assessment would be advisable in subsequent 
maintenance periods.
Box 5
IMPACT	OF	THE	APPLICATION	OF	THE	TWO-TIER	SYSTEM	(cont’d)
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Spanish goods imports have slowed appreciably over the 
past two years. In particular, on National Accounts figures, 
the annual growth rate of goods imports has fallen from 
4.1% on average in the 2016-27 period to 1% taking the 
average of the past two years. 
The key determinant of the behaviour of goods imports is 
final demand. Imports usually react more than 
proportionately to changes in this latter variable. This was 
particularly the case in the two years spanning 2016-
2017, when final demand grew by 3.3%, but not so in 
2018-2019, when the related growth rate was 2.2%. 
There are various potential factors behind this lower 
elasticity of imports to final demand. Firstly, it might be due 
to an across-the-board reduction in the import content of 
the various components of final demand (i.e. national 
demand and exports). In turn, it might be attributable to 
various causes including, for one, an improvement in the 
Spanish economy’s competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of 
the world, which would be conducive to the substitution of 
national production for imported inputs; and, for another, 
some reversal in the development of global value chains, 
which appears to have been witnessed internationally 
since the outbreak of the global financial crisis.1 Secondly, 
the greater flatness of Spanish goods imports in the past 
two years, compared with final demand, might be on 
account of a composition effect, whereunder those final 
demand components with a greater (lesser) import content 
would have posted lower (higher) growth rates. 
The OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database provides 
the foreign value added incorporated into each of the final 
demand items. The latest available data are for 2015, 
meaning that it is not possible to assess with this 
information the role that the first of the aforementioned 
factors (i.e. a hypothetical proportional reduction in the 
import content of the various components of final demand) 
might have played in the slowdown in imports in 2018-
2019. It is possible, however, using the import content 
figures for 2015 from this database, to assess the extent 
to which the second factor (i.e. composition effect) may 
have had a bearing on the loss of momentum of imports, 
a matter which is analysed hereafter. 
Chart 1 shows that the foreign value added incorporated 
into Spanish final demand totalled 23% in 2015; however, 
this ratio differed substantially across the main demand 
captions. Thus, while foreign value added incorporated 
into gross fixed capital formation was 32%, the figure in 
the case of final consumption was 19%. As regards 
exports, their import content (23%) in the goods and 
services aggregate is in line with that for the whole of final 
demand. But not only is there marked dispersion regarding 
the import content among the different final demand 
components, but also within each component. In 
particular, Chart 2 shows that, under exports, those 
relating to the automobile sector (C29), for example, have 
a much greater import content than those evidenced by 
food exports (C10-C12). 
On the basis of this heterogeneity, an initial assessment 
can be made of the effect that the changes in the sectoral 
composition of Spanish exports in the past two years may 
have had on the behaviour of imports. In this respect, 
Chart 3 shows that, over the past two years, the exports 
that have most grown have in fact been those least 
requiring imported inputs. This same conclusion can be 
seen in Chart 4, which shows the real growth of Spanish 
goods exports observed in recent years (blue line) and 
that which would result from weighting each of the export 
components by their import content (red line). The fact 
that the blue line is above the red line in the most recent 
phase (especially in 2018) suggests, once again, that 
exports of those products less intensive in imported 
inputs grew more in this period. This would have resulted 
in a lesser sensitivity of imports to the aggregate growth 
of exports. 
The results set out in this box should be viewed with 
caution. While they may be used to rationalise the 
slowdown in imports observed in the past two years, they 
are not enough for robust conclusions to be drawn about 
the future behaviour of imports. In particular, the greater 
or lesser buoyancy of exports of a specific product in 
recent years may have been influenced by fluctuations 
in global demand, which may be reversed in the future. It 
would also be worth assessing whether the evidence in 
this box at the disaggregated level for exports is common 
to the other components of final demand, i.e. consumption 
(private and government) and the different headings of 
gross capital formation. 
Box 6
THE	EFFECT	OF	THE	CHANGE	IN	THE	COMPOSITION	OF	SPANISH	EXPORTS	ON	OVERALL	IMPORTS	
1  See, for example, ECB (2019), “The effects of tariff hikes in a world of global value chains”, Economic Bulletin 8/2019, ECB, Box 1.
This early-release box was published on 19 March
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Box 6
THE	EFFECT	OF	THE	CHANGE	IN	THE	COMPOSITION	OF	SPANISH	EXPORTS	ON	OVERALL	IMPORTS	(cont’d)
SOURCES: OECD, Customs Department and Ministerio de Asuntos Económicos y Transformación Digital.
a A01-03: agriculture; B05-B09: mining; C10-12: food products; C13-15: textiles; C16: wood; C17-C18: paper; C19: refined petroleum products; 
C20- C21: pharmaceutical products; C22: plastics; C23: non-metallic mineral products; C24: basic metals; C25: metal products; C26: electronic 
products; C27: electrical equipment; C28: other machinery; C29: automobile sector; C30: other transport equipment; C31-C33: other manufacturing; 
DE35-DE39: electricity; Other.
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Between the beginning of 2016 and mid-2018, private car 
registrations in Spain grew year-on-year by an average of 
around 5%. Thereafter, registrations began to perform 
notably less favourably, falling more than 11% in 2019. 
Chart 1 shows that this decline has been sharper than that 
in the consumption of other durables. This suggests two 
things: first, a common factor in decisions to purchase 
these goods (cars and other durables) could have been 
behind the recent slowdown. This factor would be, for 
example, the petering out of demand pent up during the 
crisis or rising global macroeconomic uncertainty. Second, 
the car industry has likely also been affected by some 
type of idiosyncratic shock.1
This box aims to analyse the extent to which developments 
in registrations in Spain have been influenced by one such 
idiosyncratic factor. Specifically, by the uncertainty 
surrounding the entry into force of a European protocol, 
the World Harmonised Light Vehicle Test Procedure 
(WLTP) in September 2018, and of other traffic restrictions 
in big cities.2
To do so, an indicator was constructed that measures 
regulatory uncertainty in the car industry using articles 
containing a series of key words published in the national 
press. Textual analysis is a well-established methodology 
in the literature for gleaning information on phenomena, 
such as uncertainty or expectations, that are hard to 
quantify.3 Specifically, articles published in seven Spanish 
newspapers4 were processed for this analysis. An index 
was built based on the frequency of the articles containing 
the words “diesel and petrol”, “electric cars”, “traffic 
restrictions”, “Madrid Central” or “WLTP”. Chart 2 tracks 
developments in this index since 2016. It points to a 
notable increase in uncertainty in the car industry in mid-
2018, when the WLTP was about to enter into force. Since 
then, this uncertainty has held at relatively high levels. 
Furthermore, it has also reacted to the entry into force of 
various forms of traffic restrictions in Madrid, Barcelona 
and other big cities.
The slowdown in new car registrations in Spain from mid-
2018 has coincided with the increase in uncertainty shown 
in Chart 2. This rising uncertainty could therefore explain 
the slowdown. To confirm such a link, new registrations 
lost in Spain since July 2018 are estimated. The loss of 
new registrations is proxied by the difference between the 
July 2018 forecast and actual registrations (see Chart 3).5 
If we combine the measure of this slowdown in new 
registrations with the uncertainty index in the car industry, 
we can see that the two variables are closely linked from 
2018 Q3 (see Chart 4). 
This uncertainty in the car industry may prove to be short-
lived and recede once agents have fully taken the 
legislative changes on board. If this is the case, new car 
registrations can be expected to gather pace again in the 
future. According to the latest survey indicators from the 
European Commission, consumers’ intention to buy a 
new car has not shifted, even in the case of younger 
drivers, whose preferences are more shaped by the latest 
technological, social and legislative developments. 
However, other factors could contribute to the continuing 
weakness in car sales. On the one hand, there is no 
established technological paradigm to replace the 
combustion engine which, after a century of use, is 
showing signs of coming to an end. On the other, regulatory 
changes and technological developments could lead to 
price rises, which would naturally have an impact on 
demand for cars. For example, in terms of manufacturing 
costs, the need to incorporate technologies that reduce 
emissions so as to comply with the new standards is a 
source of upward pressure on new car prices. 
Box 7
REGULATORY	UNCERTAINTY	AND	ITS	IMPACT	ON	CAR	SALES
1  It is also possible that rising global and domestic uncertainty has had a stronger impact on car sales than on sales of other durables, owing to the 
importance of car purchases, given their amount, in household consumption decisions   
2  For further information on the implementation of the WLTP, see Box 4, “Impact of the new emissions regulation on the automobile market”, Quarterly 
Report on the Spanish Economy, Economic Bulletin, 4/2018, Banco de España.
3	 	See,	 inter	alia,	S.	Baker,	N.	Bloom,	and	S.	Davis,	“Measuring	Economic	Policy	Uncertainty”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 131, No 4, 
November 2016, pp. 1593–1636, and C. Ghirelli, J. Pérez and A. Urtasun (2019), “Measuring economic and economic policy uncertainty and their 
macroeconomic effects: the case of Spain”, Empirical Economics, September.
4  The four general newspapers (El País, La Vanguardia, ABC and El Mundo) and the three business newspapers (El Economista, Cinco Días and 
Expansión) with the highest circulation were used.
5  The estimates are made through a univariate model used by the Banco de España for analysing this variable. This model showed a successful 
statistical adjustment before the introduction of the new legislation. July 2018 has been selected as the start date for the projection exercise because 
new	registrations	 in	August	were	already	heavily	distorted	by	the	entry	 into	force	of	the	WLTP	legislation	 in	September.	Specifically,	 in	August	car	
dealers	moved	to	clear	their	car	stocks	that	would	not	meet	the	new	standards.	They	offered	heavy	discounts	and	resorted	to	self-registration	for	final	
sale at a later date. This led to a bounce in August, tailing off in September, as shown in Chart 3.
This early-release box was published on 24 February
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Box 7
REGULATORY	UNCERTAINTY	AND	ITS	IMPACT	ON	CAR	SALES	(cont’d)
SOURCES: ANFAC, INE, Factiva Dow Jones and Banco de España.
a Barcelona LEZ refers to the approval of the Low Emissions Zones in Barcelona, in force since 1 January 2020, and Madrid 360 to the unveiling of 
the Madrid Municipal Council's latest air quality and climate change plan.
b Uncertainty is depicted in terms of the six-month moving average. The loss of new car registrations is the difference between actual registrations 
and those forecast in July 2018.
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The coronavirus health crisis has completely dominated developments 
in the international financial markets in recent weeks, giving rise to very 
strong movements in financial asset prices
The	propagation	of	the	pandemic	has	caused	a	sharp	fall	in	the	stock	market	
indices	(see Chart 1). The positive market stance which characterised the previous 
quarter, with historical highs in the stock market indices of the US (S&P 500, Dow 
Jones and Nasdaq) and Europe (Stoxx Europe 600) continued at the beginning of 
the year. This trend was interrupted by the uncertainty regarding the COVID-19 
health alert, which had two distinct episodes. The first one started around 23 
January, the date when the Chinese city of Wuhan, the centre of the outbreak, was 
quarantined, and had a relatively limited impact on global markets. The second one, 
associated with the expansion of the virus to other geographical areas (particularly 
after outbreaks appeared in Italy, South Korea and Iran) started on 21 February, 
triggering a fall in global stock indices not seen since 2008. Since then until the cut-
off date of this report, the S&P 500 had declined by 30.9% and the Euro Stoxx 50 
had dropped 32.9%. These falls reflect both the market’s concern about the effect 
of the health crisis on the profits of listed companies and the increase in investors’ 
risk aversion, factors which the decisiveness of economic policies had barely started 
to contain around mid-March. This high uncertainty has also been reflected in the 
volatility of equity markets, which have reached values close to their all-time highs 
both in the United States and in Europe. 
The	 decline	 in	 stock	 market	 indices	 has	 affected	 all	 economic	 sectors,	
especially	 the	banking,	energy	and	tourism	sectors.	The sharp falls in banks’ 
share prices reflect the market’s concern about the future changes in the quality of 
bank assets, against a backdrop of a strongly worsening short-term macroeconomic 
outlook. In the case of energy and tourism, the sharp drop in the stock prices of 
listed companies includes the comparatively higher effects which the health crisis 
would have on their volume of activity and expected future earnings. 
The	health	crisis	has	also	had	a	 strong	 impact	on	sovereign	debt	markets,	
prompting	sharp	falls	 in	the	 long-term	yields	of	the	higher-rated	bonds	 (see 
Chart 1). These decreases can be explained both by the search for safe assets and 
by the downward revision of interest rate expectations. US and German sovereign 
10-year bond yields posted record lows over the quarter, to stand at below 0.5% and 
-0.8%, respectively. However, in the last few days these movements have reversed, 
particularly in the case of the German 10-year bond yield, to a level above that of 21 
February, prior to the worsening of the geographical spreading of the disease. This 
2	 INTERNATIONAL	FINANCIAL	MARKETS
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increase in the yield on German debt, also seen in the case of US debt, might reflect 
the need for investors to raise funds, which would explain the sale of highly liquid 
assets such as sovereign debt. Also noteworthy is the increase in the sovereign risk 
premia in the euro area, particularly in Italy and Greece, which was partially reversed 
following the announcement by the ECB of a new asset purchase programme on 18 
March 2020. 
High-risk	corporate	debt	yield	spreads	have	rebounded	strongly	and	the	dollar	
has	 depreciated	 against	 the	 euro	 and	 the	 yen.	 US and European high-yield 
corporate credit spreads posted increases of 592 bp and 582 bp, respectively, in the 
quarter to date. This increase reflects both investors’ risk aversion and the perceived 
worsening of issuer credit quality resulting from the adverse effects of the coronavirus 
on activity. In the case of the US market, the strong falls in oil prices in the last few 
weeks appear to be leading to significant downward revisions of the perceived credit 
quality in firms that are more exposed to oil extraction activities. Also, the depreciation 
of the dollar against the euro and the yen could be responsive to the narrowing 
interest rate spreads between these economies. However, this trend has reversed in 
the last few days, probably, at least in part, owing to the global demand for dollars, 
in a setting where the US dollar is playing its usual role as a safe-haven currency 
during episodes of high uncertainty, such as the current one. The high demand for 
funding in dollars was reflected in the increase in the cost of acquiring dollars through 
Financial markets in 2020 Q1 have been marked by the increase in risk aversion and the downturn in the macroeconomic outlook as a result 
of the coronavirus health crisis. The reflection of this has been a heavy decline in the main stock market indices and, initially, declines in 
long-term sovereign debt yields meeting high credit standards, the performance of which has also been influenced by higher expectations of 
interest rate reductions. More recently, long-term sovereign debt yields have risen, perhaps in response to the sale of this type of asset by 
investors with liquidity requirements and/or to the expected strong increase in issues on this market to fund public spending programmes so 
as to offset the adverse effects of the health crisis.
STOCK MARKET INDICES SLIDE AND SOVEREIGN DEBT YIELDS DECLINE AGAINST A BACKDROP OF HIGH RISK AVERSION
Chart 1
SOURCE: Refinitiv Datastream.
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currency swaps, which led to a coordinated action by the main central banks to 
increase currency exchange transactions between them and to expand them to 
more countries.
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3.1  External environment of the euro area
The global economic situation has been driven by the spread of the 
coronavirus epidemic.
In	the	last	quarter,	the	global	spread	of	the	COVID-19	coronavirus	drastically	
influenced	 the	 international	economic	environment. The pandemic’s negative 
impact on international activity and trade is expected to be substantial, although the 
magnitude is still subject to a high degree of uncertainty. Consequently, analysts’ 
growth forecasts for this year have begun to undergo substantial downward revisions, 
with an unusually high dispersion (see Charts 2.1 and 2.2). Many countries are 
expected to enter a recession in the short-term, but most professional forecasters 
expect the impact of COVID-19 to be transitory, and their forecasts therefore factor 
in an improvement in growth in the second half of the year and, in some cases, also 
in the level of GDP in 2021. However, the uncertainty surrounding the duration and 
global spread of the pandemic implies that these forecasts are also subject to great 
uncertainty.
With	the	exception	of	China,	the	most	common	activity	indicators	do	not	yet	
reflect	the	impact	of	the	spread	of	COVID-19. In China, the manufacturing PMI 
plummeted to 35.7 points in February (compared with 50 points posted in January), 
with sharp declines in most of its components. The first two months of the year as a 
whole witnessed a slump, in year-on-year terms, in industrial output (-13.5%), retail 
sales (-20.5%) and investment (-24.5%). Activity in most service sectors, with the 
exception of the financial sector, deteriorated, particularly the hotels and restaurants 
and transport sectors, which have been hard hit by the restrictions on people’s 
movements imposed by the Chinese government.  In contrast, the PMIs of the rest 
of the world do not yet reflect any notable effects linked to coronavirus (see Chart 
2.3), as the surveys were conducted before the epidemic spread outside Asia. 
However, more recent evidence on economic activity anticipates a significant 
worsening of the economic environment across all geographical areas, particularly 
in countries which have suffered the most severe outbreaks of the virus and have 
been forced to implement drastic measures to contain the epidemic. For similar 
reasons, the decline in economic activity is more pronounced in sectors such as 
tourism and transport. In general, according to high-frequency data, the financial 
vulnerability of emerging economies has increased, with the depreciation of their 
currencies, higher sovereign risk levels and plummeting portfolio capital flows, and 
is far more marked than in previous episodes of financial stress in these markets, 
including the global financial crisis (see Chart 2.4).
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The spread of the coronavirus COVID-19 epidemic has lowered the level of activity and commodities prices, leading to a downturn in growth 
forecasts. At the same time, it has tightened financial market conditions.
THE IMPACT OF CORONAVIRUS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Chart 2
SOURCES: Consensus Forecast, Thomson Reuters, IHS Markit, JP Morgan and Bloomberg.
a The ISM index has been used for the United States.
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The	 spread	 of	 the	 epidemic	 has	 triggered	 a	 slump	 in	 commodity	 prices,	
particularly	in	oil	prices. As a result, the growth forecasts of commodity exporters 
have been significantly affected. The lower expected global demand for commodities 
led to a pronounced drop in oil prices, although metal and food prices also declined 
(see Chart 2.5). In March, the price per barrel of Brent plunged by 50%, from 55 to 
27 US dollars (see Chart 2.6), owing to the fall-off in demand caused by the pandemic 
and to the failure of the OPEC and Russia to reach an agreement to limit the global 
oil supply at their meeting on 5 and 6 March. In this setting, Saudi Arabia decided to 
increase its oil supply, thus lowering the price of this commodity. The price of gold, 
which had posted increases owing to its use as a safe-haven asset, has decreased 
by more than 10% in the last few days, as a result of sales by investors in need of 
liquidity in an environment of heightened uncertainty in financial markets.
A	contraction	in	international	trade	seems	inevitable,	owing	to	the	disruption	
of	global	supply	chains. Global trade in goods fell by 0.4% in 2019 with respect to 
2018. Moreover, the new export orders component of the manufacturing PMIs 
dropped below the threshold of 50 for all main world economies in February, even 
before the full effects of the pandemic could be felt. At the beginning of the year, 
some positive international trade developments contributed to improving the outlook, 
such as the approval by the US Senate of the new United States-Mexico-Canada 
Agreement (USMCA), and the alliance formed by the European Union and a group of 
16 countries, including China and Brazil, to settle trade disputes through an appeals 
and arbitration system at the WTO. However, the positive impact of these 
developments was overshadowed by the grinding to a halt of trade caused by the 
spread of the COVID-19 epidemic. In China, which is a leading indicator for other 
geographical areas, since the spread of the virus there leads that of the rest of the 
world by two months, exports fell by 17% in January-February, compared to the 
same period in 2019. In addition, China’s high degree of integration in global supply 
chains and its role in shaping global commodity demand, are expected to amplify 
the slump in trade to other geographical areas. 
3.2  The euro area
Economic growth in the euro area was already weak before the health crisis 
spread
Economic	activity	in	the	euro	area	was	surprisingly	weak	at	end-2019.	In 2019 
Q4, GDP growth slowed to 0.1% in quarter-on-quarter terms and was below 
expectations (see Chart 3.1). Such a low rate is attributable to GDP growth of 
practically zero in Germany and activity contracting in France and Italy (see Chart 3.2). 
In the euro area as a whole, the slowdown observed was the result of a lower 
contribution by domestic demand, while the external sector’s contribution improved 
with respect to prior quarters. In turn, the negative contribution to GDP growth by 
changes in inventories increased (see Chart 3.3).
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The	mainly	qualitative	information	concerning	the	first	quarter	is	from	before	
the	epidemic’s	expansion	to	the	euro	area.	Overall, this information was consistent 
with a slight improvement in outlook. Specifically, industrial production had 
performed more positively in January, while the indicators relating to activity in the 
services sector signalled that its growth rate was holding steady. Consumer 
confidence and employment expectations, in both services and construction, had 
improved up to February and the unemployment rate held at 7.4 % in January, its 
lowest rate since 2008. However, in February the opinions on export order books 
evidenced the effects of the health crisis in China. Furthermore, corporate lending 
has recently slowed even further.
The pandemic has significantly worsened short-term activity prospects 
In	the	short	term,	the	euro	area’s	economic	outlook	has	deteriorated	abruptly	
and	sharply	on	account	of	the	COVID-19	epidemic	spreading	through	Europe. 
The confinement measures, required to stop the transmission of the virus are 
adversely impacting the economy on both the supply side, given the disruption to 
(global and local) production chains, and, especially, the demand side, because of 
the resulting significant fall-off in household and business expenditure, against a 
backdrop of uncertainty reaching levels unheard of in decades. The effects of all 
Euro area GDP growth remained very weak in Q4, with declines in France and in Italy. The increase in GDP was essentially underpinned by 
external demand. The latest information indicates that the decline in activity as a result of the health crisis will be most pronounced.
THE SITUATION OF ECONOMIC SLUGGISHNESS CONTINUES IN THE EURO AREA
Chart 3
SOURCES: Eurostat, Markit Economics and ECB.
a Excluding Ireland, owing to the major fluctuations shown by some of its GDP components as a result of the effect of multinationals.
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these developments are particularly pronounced in the case of certain sectors, such 
as those related to tourism, transport and leisure. Even so, while it is currently clear 
that the euro area economy is facing a very profound shock, there remains a very 
high level of uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the pandemic’s economic 
impact and how long such impact will last. Specifically, it is hard to forecast how 
quickly the measures implemented by the health authorities will successfully contain 
the epidemic. This also depends on exogenous factors, such as the probable 
decrease in viral transmission once summer arrives.
Against	this	exceptionally	uncertain	backdrop,	euro-area	growth	prospects,	
both	those	of	private	analysts	and	official	bodies,	are	undergoing	abrupt	and	
pronounced	downward	revisions,	above	all	for	2020.	The pace at which events 
are unfolding means that larger downward revisions are being made as the days go 
by. For example, the downward revision to projected GDP growth for 2020 of 
0.3  percentage points (to 0.8%) in the ECB’s most recent projection exercise, 
concluded at the end of February, is very modest in light of March’s worrying events 
(see Table 1). In this connection, private analysts’ and public institutions’ forecasts 
available at the date of this report point, in many cases, to steep drops in GDP this 
year. In any case, on the assumption that the epidemic is controlled beyond the 
short term, the highly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, detailed in 
Section 5, should enable a sustained recovery in GDP growth from the second half 
of the year. This would also be supported by the end of the confinement measures 
in the rest of the world bolstering external demand.
This	scenario	is	surrounded	by	downside	risks.	In particular, it is possible that 
the health policy measures required to mitigate the epidemic need to be prolonged 
for an extended period, with the consequent adverse impact on activity. Furthermore, 
even if the epidemic can be controlled swiftly, it is possible that a shock of this 
magnitude, albeit temporary, will cause some long-lasting damage to the business 
sector, agents’ confidence and employment.
EURO AREA GDP AND HICP GROWTH FORECASTS (a)
Table 1
SOURCE: ECB, European Commission, Consensus Forecast, IMF and OECD.
a The figures in brackets are the change with respect to the previous forecast, which relates to December 2019 for the ECB, November for the EC 
and the OECD, October for the IMF and February 2020 for Consensus.
220212020202
GDP HICP GDP HICP GDP HICP
European Central Bank (March 2020) 0.8 (-0.3) 1.1 (0.0) 1.3 (-0.1) 1.4 (0.0) 1.4 (0.0) 1.6 (0.0)
European Commission (February 2020) 1.2 (0.0) 1.3 (+0.1) 1.2 (0.0) 1.4 (+0.1)
)0.0( 2.1)3.0-( 8.0)0202 hcraM( DCEO
International Monetary Fund (January 2020) 1.3 (-0.1)  1.4 (0.0)
Consensus Forecast (March 2020) 0.6 (-0.3) 1.1 (-0.1) 1.3 (+0.1) 1.4 (0.0)
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The inflation outlook is being shaped by the impact of recent developments 
on activity and on oil prices 
Inflation	in	the	euro	area	remains	low. During Q1, euro area inflation was influenced 
by energy prices, whose decline reduced the year-on-year rate of change in the 
harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) to 1.2% in February, according to the 
flash data. Core inflation, which strips out energy and food prices, likewise stood at 
1.2% in February, somewhat below the figure observed at end-2019 (see Chart 4.1), 
owing chiefly to lower services inflation. Several factors indicate that inflationary 
pressures will remain subdued in the immediate future: first, unit labour costs are 
easing; second, the marked decline in oil prices appears to be curbing production 
costs (see Chart 4.2).
The	March	ECB	projection	exercise	maintains	the	low	inflation	outlook	for	the	
next	three	years	(see Table 1). Inflation is expected to gradually recover somewhat 
in the medium term, underpinned by less economic slack, which would support a 
slightly more expansionary performance from labour costs and unit profits. In any 
event, the ramifications of the disease’s spread in the euro area, which occurred 
after the ECB’s projection exercise was completed, underscore the downside risks 
to these projections, amid a scenario in which the deflationary consequences of 
Inflation declined in February to 1.2% (inflation excluding energy and fresh food was also 1.2%), interrupting the rising path of the previous months. 
There is no discernible pass-through of higher labour costs to prices. The downtrend in long-term inflation expectations has steepened.
THE LEVEL OF EURO AREA INFLATION REMAINS LOW
Chart 4
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Eurostat and ECB.
a In 2019 this variable includes the conversion in France of the tax credit for competitiveness and employment (CICE) into a permanent 
social contributions rebate. 
b Monthly average of daily data.
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lower demand are likely to prevail over the counteracting effects associated with 
supply disruptions. This is the reading that may be inferred from long-term inflation 
expectations, which in the most recent period followed a steep downward path and 
marked an all-time low (see Chart 4.3).
Financing conditions in the economy had remained accommodating before 
the crisis hit, but there are signs of tightness that economic policies are 
seeking to address 
The	crisis	will	foreseeably	drive	up	perceived	risk	in	general	and	produce	less	
favourable	 financing	 conditions	 for	 the	 private	 sector. Prior to the epidemic 
spreading to Europe, interest rates on new corporate and household loans stood 
close to record lows, as evidenced by the latest data relating to January. Similarly, 
the cost of corporate financing on the fixed-income markets had followed a declining 
trend early in the quarter. However, this was cut short in late February when credit 
risk premiums climbed in response to the spreading of the health crisis. 
The	health	crisis	could	also	have	adverse	effects	on	credit	supply,	which	 the	
various	economic	authorities	are	attempting	to	contain. The information provided 
in the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) precedes the epidemic’s arrival in the euro area. 
Specifically, this data source shows that credit standards for approving loans to 
corporations and households held stable in 2019 Q4, with the exception of the slight 
tightening in consumer credit and other lending to households. In addition, at that time 
institutions envisaged no significant changes in the credit supply to corporations during 
2020 Q1, although for household lending they anticipated some tightening in loans 
extended for house purchases and a slight loosening in consumer credit and other 
lending. However, growing uncertainty over the health crisis, greater risk perception 
among borrowers and rising risk premia on bank funding markets could ultimately have 
a negative bearing on credit supply, particularly if these factors persist over time.
Financing	 to	 the	 non-financial	 private	 sector	 sustained	 robust	 growth	 in	 the	
months	 prior	 to	 the	 crisis.	The year-on-year growth rate in loans to non-financial 
corporations stood at 3.2% in January, down 0.6 pp on the figure for October. Conversely, 
in that same time period the growth in financing through the issuance of fixed-income 
securities was up by half a percentage point to 5.7%. Lending to households gained 
further traction through to January, expanding 3.7% year-on-year in that month, driven 
by greater buoyancy in loans extended for house purchases and consumer credit.
The euro area economic authorities have responded with expansionary 
policies to counter the adverse effects of the pandemic
There	has	been	a	swift	response	in	terms	of	the	ECB’s	monetary	policy	and	
national	 fiscal	 policies	 to	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 challenge.	 As regards monetary 
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stimulus measures, at its regular meeting on 12 March, the ECB Governing Council 
approved a package of measures, which was bolstered by another more forceful 
package on 18 March at an extraordinary meeting, in light of how the situation had 
deteriorated in the interim. The response in terms of fiscal policy has been broad-
based across countries, albeit with different degrees of intensity. Governments in 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, among others, have announced 
a broad raft of measures, which have also been strengthened by supra-national 
measures, led by the European Commission. Section 5 of this Report sets out the 
contents of the different initiatives launched.
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The momentum of Spanish economic activity in January and February was 
similar to that recorded at end-2019
In	2019	Q4,	Spanish	GDP	continued	to	grow	at	a	relatively	high	rate,	clearly	
outpacing	GDP	growth	in	the	euro	area.	Indeed, quarter-on-quarter GDP growth 
increased by 0.1 pp to 0.5% during that period. This growth in GDP was underpinned 
by an improved contribution of the external sector, thanks to both the recovery in 
exports of goods and tourism, and the decline in imports. In contrast, the contribution 
of domestic demand to quarter-on-quarter GDP growth was negative, owing to the 
slowdown in spending on private consumption and the decline in gross fixed capital 
formation.
This	 favourable	 pattern	 held	 during	 the	 first	 two	 months	 of	 the	 year.	 The 
available indicators as at January and February suggest that activity during that 
period showed a similar performance to that seen at end-2019, as detailed in Box 1. 
However, the spread of the coronavirus health crisis to the euro area, 
including Spain, in late February has drastically changed this dynamic
The	monthly	indicators	available	at	the	cut-off	date	of	this	report	do	not	yet	
include	the	impact	of	the	COVID-19	crisis	as	they	refer	to	January	and	February.	
However, there is little doubt as to the severity of the shock, which has radically 
changed the real and financial dynamics of the Spanish economy since early March. 
International	travel	flows	were	one	of	the	first	areas	where	the	consequences	
of	the	geographical	spread	of	the	pandemic	on	the	Spanish	economy	became	
clear. While the focal point of the disease remained limited to China, the direct 
impact on the Spanish economy was seemingly modest. Although conclusive 
evidence is not available, it appears that companies were generally still able to 
replace their Chinese suppliers, restricted by the confinement measures in place 
since late January, with suppliers from other geographical areas. However, since late 
February, the international spread of the disease has had a detrimental impact on 
arrivals of international travellers. 
The	quick	 rise	 in	 the	number	of	people	 infected	 in	European	countries	has	
required	drastic	action	to	slow	down	the	spread	of	infection,	with	far-reaching	
consequences	in	several	sectors.	These measures have included imposing severe 
restrictions on people’s movements and, in many cases, among them Spain, 
4 THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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confining people to their homes. The state of alert in Spain, in force since 15 March, 
necessary to contain the pressure of the epidemic on the healthcare system, has 
resulted in a complete suspension of activity in the retail trade (with some exceptions, 
primarily food), hotels and catering (except for home deliveries) and the entertainment 
sector. 
On	the	demand	side,	this	has	had	a	very	marked	impact	on	household	spending	
on	consumer	goods,	on	top	of	the	virtual	disappearance	of	inbound	tourism. 
There are as yet no monthly economic indicators quantifying these effects, although 
some may be proxied indirectly. Thus, for example, an indicator based on Internet 
searches related to expenditure on consumer goods and services shows a sharp 
decline since the days running up to the declaration of the state of alert (see 
Chart 5.1).1 As regards tourism flows, having begun to fall in early March, flights to or 
from a Spanish airport have quickly declined since the middle of the month (see 
Chart 5.2).
On	 the	 supply	 side,	 interruptions	 in	 both	 national	 and	 international	 supply	
chains	and	 the	sharp	decrease	 in	demand	have	 led	 to	 the	closure	of	 some	
industries.	There is still insufficient information for an assessment of the negative 
impact on employment, but it will most likely be very significant. The information 
available suggests that companies are making intensive use of temporary redundancy 
schemes involving suspension of contracts and/or short-time working. The majority 
of these job losses will be recovered if, as is to be expected, the shock proves to be 
temporary.
The	worsening	of	the	economic	outlook	and	the	heightened	uncertainty	have	
had	a	very	severe	impact	on	the	financial	markets. Between 21 February and the 
cut-off date of this report, the IBEX-35 fell by around 35%, somewhat more than the 
fall recorded by the euro area EURO STOXX 50 index. Stock price declines, which 
have been widespread across sectors, have been particularly pronounced in the 
case of shares of banks and of transportation and tourism companies. In addition, 
between 21 February and 18 March, when the ECB Governing Council announced 
its latest measures to combat the crisis, Spanish 10‑year bond yields rose by 101 bp 
to 1.2%. In view of the performance of the German bond, this entailed a widening of 
Spain’s sovereign risk premium to 146 bp. Corporate credit risk premia, which had 
remained low up to end-February, also rose very significantly up to 18 March, driving 
up the average issuance cost in this market segment. All these developments 
contributed to a tightening of financial conditions, which was an obstacle to 
overcoming the crisis. This prompted the decisive measures taken by the ECB on 
18 March (see section 5), which have given rise to a partial reversal of the developments 
described. Thus, between the announcement of the measures and the cut-off date 
1  The indicator is constructed on the basis of a set of search terms representing the different categories of 
consumption expenditure, which are subsequently aggregated on the basis of their respective share of the total.
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of this report, the Spanish 10‑year bond yield fell by 46 bp and the risk premium 
narrowed by 35 bp.
Macroeconomic forecasting is difficult in these conditions, owing to the lack 
of statistical data permitting quantification of the effects that are already 
being observed and the high degree of uncertainty going forward
The	Spanish	economic	outlook	for	the	short	term	is	highly	uncertain.	One of 
the pillars of this uncertainty relates to the degree of severity of the decrease in 
economic activity. As mentioned earlier, no monthly indicators are yet available to 
assess the intensity of the shock, although there are few doubts regarding its 
magnitude. The experience of confinement in China, where the first monthly data are 
available, suggests that the effects on activity were even greater than anticipated. 
A	second	pillar	of	uncertainty	relates	to	the	duration	of	the	health	crisis. The 
state of alert, initially two weeks, was extended for a further two weeks a few days 
before the cut-off date of this report, and at this stage the need for further extension, 
aimed at halting the spread of the epidemic, cannot be ruled out. In any event, given 
the incubation period of the disease, the effects of confinement on the numbers of 
persons infected should begin to be clear a few days after the cut-off date of this 
report. Once again, the experience of China suggests that the measures adopted 
should become fully effective in coming weeks.
Since end-February, the spread of the coronavirus health crisis outside Asia, and its arrival in Europe, has drastically altered the dynamics of 
economic activity in Spain. The monthly indicators available at the cut-off date for this report, which refer to January and February, do not yet 
capture the impact of this crisis. However, certain partial high-frequency indicators are already suggesting most pronounced impacts on 
household spending and tourism flows, among other items.
THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS HAS ABRUPTLY ALTERED THE COURSE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN SPAIN
Chart 5
SOURCES: Google Trends, European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation and Banco de España.
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A	third	factor	whose	quantitative	influence,	a	priori,	is	uncertain	is	the	relatively	
broad	 package	 of	 measures	 agreed	 in	 the	 last	 few	 days	 by	 the	 various	
economic	authorities. As described in detail in section 5 below, the tax, employment, 
monetary and supervisory authorities have announced a set of measures which, 
taken together, entail the largest mobilisation of public funds in the face of a crisis in 
recent history. At the cut-off date of this report, certain essential aspects of many of 
these measures are still pending determination, while other measures are beginning 
to be implemented. In addition, in accordance with the latest messages from the 
principal Spanish and European economic authorities, new measures to limit the 
social and economic impact of the pandemic cannot be ruled out. The depth of the 
economic downturn in the short term and its persistence in coming months will 
largely depend on the degree of success of this unprecedented set of measures.
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The rapid deterioration in global activity as a result of the pandemic has led 
to a broad-based monetary and fiscal economic policy response
Monetary authorities have generally implemented more accommodative 
policies (see Tables 2 and 3). As the epidemic took hold, the People’s Bank of China 
cut official interest rates and announced a raft of measures to encourage lending to 
private agents, especially in the most affected regions and sectors, and to reduce its 
cost. In the advanced countries, the US Federal Reserve unexpectedly reduced its 
federal funds target rate, by 50 bp on 3 March and again by 100 bp on 15 March, to 
a range of 0%-0.25%. It also announced a reduction in the discount rate, offers of 
one and three-month liquidity in the repo market, the re-establishment of swap lines 
with other central banks and an expansion in its asset purchases. The Bank of 
England also cut its key policy rate by 50 bp, to 0.25%, at an unscheduled meeting 
on 11 March, and launched a new credit line for SMEs. Other advanced countries 
have also lowered their policy interest rates, including Canada, Norway and Australia, 
while Japan announced an increase in its asset purchases. In addition, in the United 
Kingdom and in Norway, at the same time as the rate cuts, reductions were also 
announced in the counter-cyclical capital buffers banks are required to hold within 
the prudential regulation framework. Finally, there have also been policy interest rate 
reductions and other monetary policy measures in various emerging economies 
such as Brazil, Chile, Peru and Turkey.
In the euro area, the Governing Council of the ECB adopted two successive 
sets of important expansionary measures, on 12 and 18 March. The package 
approved at the regular meeting of the Governing Council of 12 March is based on 
three measures: additional longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs), the 
application of more favourable terms to TLTRO-III operations, and additional net 
asset purchases of €120 billion until the end of the year. The objectives of these 
measures are to provide sufficient liquidity to the financial system, to ensure its flow 
to households and businesses, to support bank lending (primarily to those segments 
most affected by the consequences of the health crisis, such as SMEs), and to avoid 
a tightening of the economy’s financing conditions. At the same time, the ECB 
announced a number of measures to temporarily ease banks’ capital and liquidity 
requirements. For example, supervised institutions will be permitted to operate with 
a level of capital below that established by the Pillar 2 prudential standard, the capital 
conservation buffer and the liquidity coverage ratio. Finally, the Governing Council, 
at its meeting of 12 March, decided to keep the interest rate on its main refinancing 
operations and the marginal lending facility and deposit facility rates at their current 
levels.
5  THE ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSE TO THE HEALTH EMERGENCY CRISIS AT GLOBAL 
LEVEL
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MONETARY POLICY MEASURES IN SYSTEMIC COUNTRIES
Table 2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Country
Cut in benchmark 
interest rate in bp 
(to % level)
Asset purchases Credit support
Liquidity measures 
on domestic markets
Swap facilities
Euro area + €120 billion over rest of 2020
+ €750 billion over rest of 2020  
(includes commercial paper 
and self-imposed limits may 
be relaxed)
longer-term refinancing operations 
until next round of TLTRO-III 
in June (average deposit 
facility rate)
Improved TLTRO-III terms
Jun 2020 - Jun 2021
Banks permitted to operate 
below required capital level
Coordinated
with other 
central banks 
United
States
-150 bp 
(0%-0.25%)
Purchases of Treasury 
bonds for $500 billion 
and of mortgage-backed 
assets for $200 billion
Reinvestment of the principal 
of the agency debt
Reduces discount window cost 
(to 0.25%). Allows use  
of liquidity and capital buffers  
to support credit
Reduces reserve 
requirement to 0% as from 
26 March. Might release 
around $208 billion
Weekly repos at 
1 and 3 months 
($500 billion)
Commercial paper 
financing facility
(CPFF)
Primary dealer credit 
facility (PDCF)
Money Market Mutual 
Fund Liquidity Facility 
(MMLF)
Coordinated with 
other central banks 
 sesahcrup launna mumixaMnapaJ
of ETFs and J-REITs doubled 
to YEN 12 billion and 
YEN 180 billion, respectively
YEN 784 billion increase
in volume of government 
bond purchases
New lending facility (0% interest, 
maturing at up to one year, and 
corporate debt as collateral)
Higher limit for commercial paper 
and corporate bonds on balance 
sheet for a total of YEN 2 trillion 
(YEN 3.2 and YEN 4.2 trillion, 
respectively)
Repos for YEN 500 
billion
Coordinated with 
other central banks
United
Kingdom
-65 bp
(0.1%)
GBP 200 billion 
increase in asset purchases: 
up to GBP 635 billion 
in sovereign and 
corporate bonds
Financing facility for SMEs, 
over 12 months, at a rate 
close to benchmark rate 
(+ Pounds Sterling 100 billion).
State guarantees on loans 
to companies affected 
(unlimited in principle, 
first phase for amount 
of Pounds Sterling 330 billion)
Coordinated with 
other central banks
China MLF (1 year):
-10 bp (3.15%)
Reverse repos:
-10 bp (2.45%;
2.55 %)
Preferential loans: 
1 year: -10 bp 
(4.05%);
5 years: -5 bp 
(4.75%)
Refinancing facility of CNY
300 billion to companies 
affected by the epidemic. 
Refinancing/rediscounting
facility of CNY 500 billion 
for SMEs
Segmented cuts 
in reserve ratio 
(equivalent to -35 bp 
on the aggregate, 
currently 10%).
Liquidity provision:
reverse repos for value 
of $174 billion 
and $71 billion
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MONETARY POLICY MEASURES IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Table 3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
Country
Cut in benchmark 
interest rate in bp 
(to % level)
Asset purchases Credit support
Liquidity measures 
on domestic markets
Swap facilities
Brazil -50 bp
(3.75%)
Sovereign bond 
repos in US dollars 
(10% discount)
Swap facility 
with the Federal 
Reserve
Mexico Exchange of longer-dated 
government bonds 
for shorter-dated ones
(MXN 41 billion allocated)
Swap facility 
with the Federal 
Reserve
Chile -75 bp
(1%)
Bank bond purchase 
programme
for $4 billion
Financing facility conditional upon 
increase in placements (FCIC)
In force for 6 months, 4-year term,  
initial amount: 3% of trade 
and consumer credit portfolio
Corporate bonds will be included 
as eligible collateral for all current 
liquidity operations in peso, 
including the FCIC
Colombia $6.5 billion increase in liquidity 
tenders. Extension of repo terms
Peru -100 bp 
(1.25%)
Overnight repos for an average 
of PEN 1.4 billion per day, 
6-month repos for 1.4 billion 
and 1-year repos for 1.5 billion
Turkey -100 bp
(9.75%)
Additional bank liquidity facility 
for credit to the business sector
Extension of maximum maturities 
for rediscounting of loans 
to exporting and services firms 
generating foreign exchange revenue
Increase in terms of repos 
and in liquidity limits
for primary dealers 
in open market operations 
Canada -100 bp
(0.75%)
Swap facility 
with the Federal 
Reserve
Australia -50 bp
(0.25%)
Forward financing facility 
for companies (additional
incentives for SMEs) for,
at least, AUD 90 billion
1-month and 3-month repos, 
indefinitely
Swap facility 
with the Federal 
Reservel
South Korea 50 bp 
(0.75%)
State bond purchases 
for $1.2 billion 
Funds will be set up 
to stabilise the bond 
market and the stock
exchange (details  
next week)
50 bp cut in loan facility to 0.25% 
to support SMEs and companies 
affected. Also, loans with a preferential
interest rate will be expanded 
to KRW 2.5 trillion (0.1% of GDP)
Increase in eligible collateral 
in open market operations 
and in life of operations 
Swap facility 
with the Federal 
Reserve.
 fo sesahcruPnedewS
government, municipal 
and mortgage-backed 
bonds for SEK 300 
billion in 2020
Forward financing facility for SEK 
500 billion to ensure flow of credit 
to companies
Swap facility 
with the Federal 
Reserve
Denmark +15 bp
(-0.60%)
1-week and 3-month loan facilities Swap facility 
with the Federal 
Reserve
and the ECB
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The ECB’s latest extraordinary measures include a special €750 billion asset 
purchase programme. The extraordinary measures adopted by the Governing 
Council on 18 March to alleviate the effects of the coronavirus crisis include a new 
asset purchase programme (the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, PEPP) 
of private and public-sector securities with a very large overall envelope, of €750 
billion. The programme will continue until the end of the year, or later if necessary. 
For the purchases of public sector securities, the benchmark allocation across 
jurisdictions will continue to be the capital key of the national central banks, although 
a flexible approach will be taken, allowing temporary deviations from this guideline. 
Also, for the purposes of this programme, a waiver of the eligibility requirements for 
securities issued by the Greek government will be granted for purchases under the 
PEPP. As regards purchases of private-sector securities, the ECB has also announced 
an extension to the range of eligible assets to include commercial paper issued by 
non-financial corporations of sufficient credit quality.
National authorities are responding to the crisis with fiscal packages, 
using a broad range of instruments 
In accordance with the global nature of the shock, the fiscal policy response 
is broad-based across countries (see Tables 4 and 5). Also, the packages approved 
tend to share some common elements. First, many of them include increases in 
health spending, in order to combat the pandemic in the countries affected. Second, 
in most cases the measures approved include action to support the income and 
expenditure of those households and businesses most affected by the pandemic, 
temporarily, while the effects last. For example, among the countries outside the 
euro area, subsidies to businesses have been designed to cover the costs arising 
from employee sick leave, in the United States and in the United Kingdom, and the 
costs arising from employees taking childcare leave, in Japan and South Korea. 
Meanwhile, China has brought forward unemployment benefits, by means of a single 
initial payment. Also, some countries (including China, South Korea and Vietnam) 
have announced tax and social-contribution payment moratoriums for the businesses 
in affected industries and regions. The cost of the fiscal measures announced to 
date varies significantly across countries, generally being within the range of 0.5%-
1% of GDP. 
In the euro area countries, given the absence of a far-reaching fiscal reaction 
at European level, the various governments have implemented emergency 
plans adapted to the needs and possibilities of each country. In Italy, the 
European country that has so far recorded the largest number of people affected, 
the government has announced a number of measures with an estimated total cost 
of €25 billion. The successive decrees approved by the Italian authorities include 
numerous measures, in different areas, to support businesses and households, as 
well as a boost to the health care and civil protection budgets. The measures for 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 1/2020  QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
FISCAL POLICY MEASURES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Table 4
SOURCE: Banco de España, drawing on national sources.
a Only includes numbers announced by governments. In general, these figures do not include the increased expenditure on unemployment insurance.
Country
Support for 
health care 
system
(as % of GDP)
Deferral or 
suspension of taxes
Support for 
households
Subsidisation of labour 
costs, unemployment 
and support for 
businesses
Liquidity provision 
to firms through 
credit lines
Aggregate
demand
Announced
budget impact 
(as % of GDP) (a)
Spain 0.3 6-month 
moratorium for tax 
debts of SMEs and 
the self-employed, 
up to a maximum 
of €30,000 per tax
Moratorium on 
mortgage payments 
for low-income 
workers and self-
employed. Benefits 
for self-employed 
who cease trading 
Exemption from 
payment for layoffs  
or short-time working 
schemes
State guarantees  
of €100 billion for non-
financial corporations' 
loans and additional 
guarantee facility  
of €2 billion for 
exporters
1.4
Italy 0.15 Deferral of most 
taxes until 31 May 
for firms and the 
self-employed
Guarantees 
for moratoria on 
mortgages, leave for 
care responsibilities, 
subsidy of €600  
for the self-employed 
and fund for low-
income workers
Unemployment subsidy 
for firms affected, 
extension to sectors 
not covered and 
suspension of social 
security contributions
Guarantees,
moratoria on loan 
repayments,
reinforcement 
of guarantee fund  
for SMEs and credit 
to cover commercial 
rents (up to €350 billion)
1.4
Germany Temporary deferral 
of taxes for firms
Increase in subsidies 
for the long-term 
unemployed and 
vulnerable
households.
Assistance for 
tenants and 
households unable to 
pay utility bills
Easing of conditions  
on which firms are 
allowed to reduce 
working hours 
(Kurzarbeit) 
Cover of social security 
payments and bills
"Unlimited" liquidity 
through KfW, €400 
billion in guarantees 
of firms' debt 
securities, €100 billion 
for recapitalisation  
of firms
Investment
programme, 
 €12 billion in 
2021-2024
(< 0.1% of GDP), 
€55 billion in 
reserve
3,5
 larrefed yraropmeTecnarF
of taxes for firms
Reinforcement of 
partial unemployment 
system
State guarantees  
for loans to SMEs
1.85
 larrefed yraropmeTlagutroP
of taxes for firms
Conciliation
measures: 66% of 
wages for leave 
owing to childcare 
responsibilities
Suspension of firms' 
social security 
contributions.
Temporary
unemployment benefit 
(2/3 of salary)
Liquidity through 
State guarantees and 
a €3 billion credit line
1.1
 larrefed yraropmeTairtsuA
of taxes for firms
Direct assistance  
to sectors such as 
tourism and shorter 
working hours
Credit guarantees 
and bridge loans
€15 billion 
in direct
emergency
assistance
3,7
Denmark Temporary deferral 
of taxes for firms
Assistance for payment 
of wages owing to 
business closure. 
Subsidies for SMEs  
for rental expenses 
and  electricity bills
State guarantees  
and a €30 billion  
credit line
1.8
United
Kingdom
0.2   Tax rebate or 
suppression of CIT 
for one year and 
subsidies for firms 
not liable for CIT
Extension of sick  
pay to include , 
quarantine to be met 
by the government in  
full for up to 14 days 
£25,000  for retailers, 
healthcare  firms  
and leisure  industry and 
£10,000 for small
businesses
State guarantees to 
firms and access to 
credit for £330 billion
Overall fiscal 
stimulus
package of £18
billion
2.2
 larrefed yraropmeTyekruT
of taxes and 
insurance
premiums
Improved mortgage 
conditions
Subsidies for shorter 
working hours
Increase in Credit 
Guarantee Fund 
Deferral of interest 
payments
Increase in 
minimum
retirement
pension
2.3
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FISCAL POLICY MEASURES IN NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Table 5
SOURCE: Banco de España, drawing on national sources.
a Solely includes numbers announced by governments. Generally, these figures do not include higher spending on unemployment insurance.
Country
Support
for health 
care system
(as % of GDP)
Deferral
or suspension 
of taxes
Support
for households
Subsidisation
of labour costs, 
unemployment
and support 
for businesses
Liquidity provision 
to firms through 
credit lines
Aggregate
demand
Announced
budget impact 
(as % of GDP) (a)
United
States
0.5 3 months' 
deferral
of personal 
income tax 
(up to $1 million) 
and corporate
 income tax 
(up to $10 million)
Students exempt 
from paying 
interest
on federal loans
Food stamps 
for children 
and Medicaid 
coverage
Remunerated sick 
leave for workers 
in quarantine
Tax relief to SMEs 
for sick employees 
Provision for 
unemployment
benefit increased 
1.19
China 0.11 Exemption 
from VAT
Exemption for 
Social Security 
contributions and 
social housing pool. 
Reduction in 
commercial
premises rentals 
Refinancing and 
extension of credit 
to SMEs and 
companies affected 
General fiscal 
stimulus
package
(1.16% 
of  GDP)
1.27
Japan < 0.1 Extension for filing 
and payment of 
income tax
Subsidisation 
of child care
Subsidies
for workers 
who have 
to take leave
Loan via 
government entities
No impact 
(coming from 
other funds 
< 0.1% of GDP)
South
Korea
0.2 9 months' deferral 
for corporate 
income,
value added 
and personal 
income tax
1 year's deferral 
for customs 
and wealth tax
Rebate for landlords 
who reduce rent
Subsidisation
of child care
Subsidisation
of firms to cover 
sick employees 
and of SMEs 
to cover illness, 
and payment
of wages 
and rentals
Loans to exporters
Guarantees to 
SMEs. Also, 
extension of due 
dates for payment 
of debt and interest
2.85
 tnemyap %0011.0 <ailartsuA
of taxes that 
the firm withholds
from staff 
(maximum
of AUD 100 million 
and minimum 
of AUD 20 million 
if no withholding 
made)
Programme
comprising
guarantees  
of 50% of the loan 
for AUD 20 billion)
$750 payment 
to low-income 
Social Security 
taxpayers
Double-up  
of job seeker 
payment
(AUD 550
fortnightly)
4.5
Canada < 0.1 Deferral for tax 
payments.
Transfers
to low-income 
individuals
Subsidisation
of sick leave 
for those 
not meeting 
requirements
(e.g. the
self-employed)
Credit lines 
to companies 
adversely
affected
(CAD 10 billion)
3.2
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businesses include notably tax reductions and deferrals (such as the suspension of 
social contribution and VAT payments to 31 May for businesses with a turnover of up 
to €2 million and for all businesses in the hardest-hit sectors) and liquidity support, 
in particular the moratorium introduced for loan payments, applicable to all SMEs 
affected by the pandemic, which can request the suspension or extension of loans 
granted up to 31 January 2020.2 The moratorium covers payment of the principal of 
the loan, under certain circumstances, and the possibility of extending the loan 
maturity. Other notable measures affecting businesses are the creation of an 
assistance fund of €750 million for businesses affected by production stoppages, 
the introduction of a public guarantee mechanism for the banking system to enable 
lending to medium-sized and large businesses affected by the crisis to be expanded 
(the government will cover 80% of loans, in order to release funding of €10 billion), 
and the provision of guarantees for loans of up to €5 billion, through the expansion 
of a Central Guarantee Fund. As for the measures to support households and the 
self-employed, the following are notable: (1) suspension for up to 18 months of 
mortgage payments on first homes (with a budget allocation of €500 million) (2) the 
creation of a “last resort” fund to support low income workers (€200 million); 
(3) suspension of redundancy procedures initiated since 23 February; (4) work-life 
balance measures: 15 days of care leave (on 50% of wage) or, alternatively, “babysitter 
vouchers” worth €600 (€1000 for health workers). These measures have been 
assigned financing of €1.2 billion; (5) €600 of compensation for self-employed 
workers.
The German government has launched a wide range of measures to mitigate 
the economic effects of coronavirus. The measures are grouped into five types of 
action. First, measures have been taken to protect household incomes, such as an 
increase in assistance to basic income recipients, greater protection for tenants 
unable to pay their rent, and assistance to low-income households to pay for basic 
supplies. Second, the conditions for firms to be eligible for the short-time allowance 
(Kurzarbeitergeld) will be eased in early April. To fund this measure, the government 
can initially use the reserves of the Federal Employment Agency (€26 billion, 0.7% of 
GDP). Third, a set of measures have been adopted at federal and state level to 
improve firms’ liquidity: tax payment deferrals have been facilitated; the amount of 
tax prepayments has been reduced in cases where a significant reduction in 
revenues is foreseen; and €50 billion (1.4% of GDP) has been allocated to direct 
assistance (in the form of one-off payments) to small firms and self-employed 
persons who were not in difficulty before the impact of coronavirus to cover recurrent 
expenses. Fourth, in order to cover firms’ liquidity needs derived from a decrease in 
activity or disruptions to supply chains, a mechanism has been established to 
provide liquidity to firms through the system of state-owned development banks, in 
co-operation with the private banking sector, in the form of loans with favourable 
2  The moratorium is based on an agreement between the Italian Banking Association (ABI) and employers’ 
associations, and 93% of Italian banks are participants.
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conditions (such as reduced interest rates), new credit facilities for firms expressly 
affected by coronavirus, and an expansion of public guarantees. The federal 
government will cover all of the new risks incurred, which could involve a volume of 
guarantees of up to €822 billion (23% of GDP). In addition, the government is setting 
up an economic stability fund for large firms in order to facilitate their market access, 
which may issue guarantees for debt securities of up to €400 billion and make 
recapitalisations of up to €100 billion. Lastly, the German federal government will 
increase the amount of its investment programme by €12.4 billion for 2021-2024 (this 
figure, however, represents on average less than 0.1% of GDP in each year). To 
finance the measures with an impact on this year’s budget, and the impact arising 
from the operation of automatic stabilisers (in particular, the reduction in public 
revenues and the increase in unemployment payments), the government has applied 
to take on €156 billion (4.5% of GDP) of new debt. 
Finally, of the three largest countries in the euro area, on 16 March, the French 
government set out a raft of economic measures to mitigate the economic 
effects of the health crisis. The French authorities estimate that the aid will cost 
€45 billion (1.7% of GDP). The partial unemployment arrangements have been shored 
up to cover the cost of temporary lay-offs triggered by business closures. €8.5 billion 
will be earmarked to pay two monthly salaries of employees who are laid off 
temporarily due to the coronavirus. Likewise, a Solidarity Fund comprising €2 billion 
has been set up to help SMEs with an annual turnover of less than €1 million a year 
that, on account of the crisis, no longer have any income or whose income falls by 
at least 70% in annual terms in March. Also, an estimated €32 billion of tax and 
social security payments will be deferred. In exceptional cases, the decision may be 
taken to refund direct taxes following an individual study. As for liquidity measures 
for firms through the provision of State guarantees, a programme of public guarantees 
for bank loans to businesses has been introduced through Bpifrance, the public 
investment bank (amounting to €300 billion, 11% of GDP). Other measures that have 
been adopted or announced include: support from the State and the Banque de 
France for renegotiating private debt repayments; the possibility, if needed, of bailing 
out publicly-owned firms, such as Air France, through recapitalisations or even 
nationalisation; or modifying government contracts to include coronavirus in force 
majeure so that penalties cannot be triggered for delays in this connection.
Spain has acted on several fronts like other countries. The volume of public 
funds mobilised is estimated to reach 8.8% of GDP. Of this total volume, 0.5% of 
GDP represents a direct increase in spending, whereas the remainder is earmarked 
for providing guarantees and credit facilities to businesses.
The first area of action is the increase in the budget allocation to address 
higher health expenditure arising from the epidemic. Specifically, the central 
government has earmarked €3.8  billion for this purpose, both at the level of the 
regional governments, which are the main healthcare providers, through an advance 
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payment of €2.8 billion in the regional government financing system, and at the level 
of the Ministry of Health based on an extraordinary loan totalling €1  billion. 
Furthermore, €30 million were allocated to financing research into the virus. 
Social protection was the second area of priority budget action. Specifically, 
regional and local governments will spend €600  million on providing services to 
vulnerable individuals. Additionally, two measures have been implemented with no 
direct impact on the government budget that likewise are intended to alleviate the 
impact of the crisis on weaker households. These measures include the obligation 
for utility companies to continue to supply water, gas and telecommunications if 
customers are unable to pay and a mortgage repayment holiday for households 
whose income decreases as a result of the crisis. Lastly, the government approved 
that individuals who are unable to work because they are infected by the coronavirus 
or under quarantine are considered to be on sick leave (whereby the State pays 
benefits from day one).
A third area of action concerns the measures intending to prevent this very 
sharp but transitory shock from causing persistent effects on activity and 
employment, once the health emergency is over. In this respect, a crucial 
objective is to try to avoid firms from being forced to cease trading or permanently 
cutting their staff where, in the absence of a pandemic, they would be viable in the 
medium term. Specifically, the government has promoted, through waiving employer 
social security contributions (100% in the case of SMEs and 75% for other 
businesses), lay-off schemes involving temporary suspension of contracts and 
shorter working days provided that employers ensure that jobs are maintained for 
the next six months. Additionally, the right of employees who are affected to draw 
unemployment benefit has been guaranteed even if they have not fulfilled the 
minimum contribution period required; the latter will not count for the calculation of 
future benefits. Drawing the discontinuation of activity benefit is made easier for the 
self-employed, provided that their turnover has dropped by at least 75%. The aim of 
all of the foregoing is that the situation of workers who are laid off temporarily or 
whose working hours are reduced, does not become permanent. This contributes to 
supporting households’ long-term income expectations and, therefore, sustains 
aggregate demand and makes it easier for economic activity to be restored once the 
health crisis is over. 
In addition, important measures were approved to counter the possibility that 
the limited liquidity of non-financial corporations might damage their viability. 
First, the government implemented guarantee facilities and public guarantees 
totalling €100  billion which are applicable to loans extended to non-financial 
corporations. Second, a moratorium was approved for the tax liabilities (up to a 
ceiling of €30,000 per type of tax) of firms with a turnover of less than €6 million 
during six months, although interest and surcharges are not applicable only during 
the first three months. Third, in order to meet the needs of the sectors which have 
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been hit hardest by the crisis, an ICO credit line has been set up for SMEs in the 
areas of tourism, transport and hotels and restaurants (amounting to €400 million) 
and an additional guarantee facility for export companies and SMEs was put in place 
(amounting to €2 billion). 
At supranational level, several EU instruments have been mobilised to support 
the measures adopted by national governments. The European Commission 
(EC) announced the use of an EU budget item, amounting to €8  billion, to cover 
health costs and to provide support for SMEs experiencing difficulties as a result of 
the effects of the pandemic. In addition to the foregoing, it also proposed the 
mobilisation of a further €29  billion in structural funds. Furthermore, the EC 
announced an easing of restrictions on State aid to make it easier for national 
authorities to grant tax credits and subsidies to the companies affected. Lastly, 
Member States will be allowed to use the flexibility clauses in the face of exceptional 
circumstances contained in the Stability and Growth Pact, which will enable them to 
temporarily deviate from the deficit path agreed with the Commission. 
Overall, the combination of the discretionary fiscal policy measures 
implemented by the Member States of the euro area and the Europe-wide 
actions represent approximately 1% of euro area GDP. All these actions 
complement the functioning of the automatic stabilisers (such as unemployment 
insurance), which in the case of the euro area are very powerful. Public measures to 
support the liquidity of private agents are calculated to amount to approximately 
10% of euro area GDP.
20.3.2020.
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Chronology of Analytical Articles. 2020 Q1.
RESULTS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS TO 2019 Q4. PRELIMINARY 
YEAR-END DATA
Álvaro Menéndez and Maristela Mulino
Published on 23 March 2020
According to the Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey, non-financial 
corporations’ activity lost momentum in 2019, resulting in a slowdown in job creation. 
However, the high inflow of dividends contributed to an increase in ordinary profit 
and, as a result, average levels of return on ordinary activities also grew. In addition, 
financing costs continued to decline, allowing the spread between the return on 
investment and this indicator to widen again. Extraordinary costs and revenue had 
an adverse impact on net profit, triggering a notable decline. Average debt ratios, 
expressed as both a percentage of assets and as a percentage of ordinary profit, 
continued to fall in 2019. The share of profits used to service debt also continued to 
decline and stands at a record low. The article contains a box analysing the recent 
developments in trade finance and the average supplier-payment and customer-
collection periods.
THE EU-MERCOSUR FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: MAIN FEATURES 
AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
Jacopo Timini and Francesca Viani
Published on 17 March 2020
This article describes the main characteristics of the trade agreement reached 
between the European Union (EU) and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) 
in 2019 and presents estimates of its possible impact on trade and GDP in the two 
areas.
It is an ambitious agreement involving the full liberalisation of almost all of the goods 
trade between the two blocs, facilitating the provision of services and the reduction 
of non-tariff barriers, and envisaging reciprocal liberalisation of public procurement. 
Similarly, it includes provisions on the protection of the environment and workers’ 
rights.
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The agreement’s estimated effects on trade and economic activity will be significant 
for MERCOSUR. The impact for the EU will be more modest, yet always positive, 
since trade with MERCOSUR is less significant for EU members. Spain is among the 
EU member countries whose economies will benefit most from the agreement.
POPULATION AT RISK OF POVERTY OR SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN SPAIN, 
ACCORDING TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL DEFINITION
Aitor Lacuesta and Brindusa Anghel
Published on 5 March 2020
This article describes the concept of population at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
that is used to quantify the targets set in this respect for the countries of the European 
Union. Drawing on this definition, the article analyses how poverty in Spain has 
evolved. It also examines the factors that have contributed to poverty levels in Spain 
still being above the official targets for 2020 and the average of the rest of the 
countries of the European Union. Lastly, some aspects of the definition are identified 
that suggest that the concept of economic poverty should be addressed from several 
complementary standpoints.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCING AND BANK LENDING TO THE NON-
FINANCIAL PRIVATE SECTOR 2019 H2
Pana Alves, Fabián Arrizabalaga, Javier Delgado and Alejandro Ferrer
Published on 20 February 2020
In the final stretch of 2019, the funds raised by households and non-financial 
corporations grew at very moderate rates, somewhat below those recorded in the 
first half of the year. This occurred against a setting of weak demand for funds, in 
which credit standards for bank loans had tightened slightly, although the cost of 
credit declined again, in keeping with the more accommodative monetary policy 
stance. Deposit institutions’ loan portfolios continued to contract, albeit at a more 
moderate pace, while their average quality improved, with further reductions in the 
NPL ratio and in foreclosed assets.
IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON FINANCIAL INCLUSION
Esther Barruetabeña
Published on 18 February 2020
Advances in new technologies give millions of people who experience financial 
exclusion globally the opportunity to access and use financial services. This article 
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describes the main benefits of financial innovation, particularly in emerging 
economies. It also identifies the main challenges associated with financial innovation, 
including the potential effects of digitalisation on financial exclusion, and possible 
ways to address these.
THE END OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND IN LATIN AMERICA: 
CHALLENGES FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES
Juan Carlos Berganza, Rodolfo Campos, Enrique Martínez Casillas and Javier Pérez
Published on 13 February 2020
Population ageing is a major global challenge. The Latin American economies have 
a younger population structure than other emerging and advanced economies, 
which has allowed them to enjoy the so-called demographic dividend (a favourable 
working age/non-working age population ratio). However, according to the latest 
demographic projections of the United Nations (UN), it is estimated that in 2020 the 
Latin American population pyramid will resemble that of the advanced economies in 
1990 and that, by around 2050, both groups will have similar population profiles. 
This article documents the current demographic trends in Latin America and 
discusses the main related challenges, in particular, those arising from the adaptation 
of social welfare systems to population ageing.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFLATION RATES IN ADVANCED 
ECONOMIES
Luis J. Álvarez, Ana Gómez Loscos and M.ª Dolores Gadea
Published on 11 February 2020
This article analyses the link between the changes in and the drivers of inflation in a 
broad range of advanced economies, with special emphasis on those of the euro 
area. Inflation rates are seen to be highly synchronised across countries, especially 
in the euro area economies, reflecting their close economic and financial links and 
the common monetary policy. Also, the comovement of inflation is found to be a 
phenomenon that tends to be more visible in the medium and long term. At the 
same time, the synchronisation of core inflation, which is based on products with 
more stable prices, is seen to be limited. The interdependence of headline inflation, 
by contrast, is significantly higher and has increased considerably in recent years. 
The drivers of inflation, according to New Keynesian Phillips curve models, such as 
inflation expectations, the cyclical position and external prices, also help to explain 
the relationship between inflation rates in advanced economies and especially in 
those of the euro area.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 58 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 1/2020  ANALYTICAL ARTICLES
AGEING, PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Brindusa Anghel and Aitor Lacuesta
Published on 6 February 2020
The article analyses how labour market participation and the type of work performed 
change with age. Drawing on data from the OECD’s Programme for the International 
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), it is documented that as people age 
they gradually lose certain skills relating to their ability to do physical work or use 
new technologies, or their literacy and numeracy skills. By contrast, as they build up 
experience, older workers develop better planning skills and a greater ability to 
supervise the work of others and respond to setbacks. However, the transition 
between these tasks is not problem-free, especially in certain sectors, such as 
agriculture, small retail trade, hotels and restaurants and domestic help, which in 
Spain are more likely to have a higher concentration of older workers with a lower 
level of education than in the rest of the euro area. In this respect, larger firm size, 
flexible working environments, retirement schemes with certain specificities relating 
to skills required in different occupations and an increase in continuing training 
would all be conducive to a lower decline in productivity and a higher degree of 
employability of older workers. This is particularly important in Spain’s current 
demographic context of a gradually ageing population.
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According to the Bank Lending Survey, during 2019 Q4, credit standards tightened 
slightly for all categories of lending in Spain, whereas this only affected consumer 
credit and other lending to households in the euro area. In this segment, the general 
terms and conditions on new lending eased, both in Spain and in the euro area as a 
whole. Furthermore, in Spain, the terms and conditions on loans to households for 
house purchase tightened slightly. Demand for all types of credit in Spain decreased, 
whereas in the euro area as a whole loan applications from enterprises declined and 
those from households increased. According to the responding banks, regulatory 
and supervisory actions on capital, leverage and liquidity had a negligible impact on 
credit supply in Spain in the second half of 2019, whereas they prompted a slight 
tightening in the euro area. The NPL ratio contributed to a tightening of credit 
standards (in consumer credit in Spain and in the other two segments in the euro 
area). Lastly, as for the ECB’s TLTRO III (the third series of targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations), the banks’ participation in the September operation was 
limited and increased significantly in the December operation, as they were 
essentially attracted by the favourable conditions of this funding.
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ACRONYMS	AND	ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with the protocol order, the EU Member States are listed 
using the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
AIReF Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility
AMCESFI Spanish macroprudential authority
APP Asset Purchase Programme
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOP Balance of Payments
CBA CBSO Annual Survey
CBI Integrated CBSO Annual Survey 
CBQ CBSO Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
COVID-19 Coronavirus disease 2019 
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
EC European Commission 
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFB European Fiscal Board
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FOMC Federal Open Market Committee
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Official Credit Institute 
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer‑term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MREL Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non‑financial corporations
NPISHs Non‑profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PEPP Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme
PER Price/earnings ratio
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer‑tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organization
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.
H1, H2 Calendar half-years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
bp Basis points.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non‑existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
